As set out by Mykhailo Fedorov, the Minister of Defence of Ukraine, the targetting of the R-280 highway since mid-April 2026 was designed to achieve a "logistics breakdown" (or "logistics lockdown"^[15]) for Russia.^[13]

Unlike a year earlier, by mid-May 2026, Ukraine's rapidly expanded capacity to produce and deploy advanced drones enabled an unprecedented and sustained campaign to pressure and isolate Crimea.^[13] The low cost of Ukraine's latest drones, such as the Hornet and Dart, also financially defeated the much more expensive MANPAD missiles and about equally expensive proximity-fused shells for a heavy anti-aircraft gun that the Russian military tried to intercept them with.^[13] Ukrainian anti-bridge drones striking the Chonhar and Henichesk Bridges, such as the Behemoth, cost less than 50,000 USD, a fraction of a Storm Shadow/SCALP cruise missile at 2,000,000 USD apiece that Ukraine used to take out the Chonhar Bridge in 2023.^[13]

On 27 May 2026, Fedorov announced an additional 5 billion Ukrainian hryvnia (113 million USD) in funding for the frontline units that had proven most effective in carrying out operations of the middle strike campaign.^[2]

On 22 June 2026, SBU major general Viktor Yahun told UNIAN that the campaign's objective was not (yet) a Ukrainian ground offensive to liberate Crimea, but to make maintaining the Russian military occupation of Crimea "as difficult and expensive as possible for the enemy".^[15][16] "That is why the key targets are not seaside resorts, nor even military bases. The targets are bridges, railway junctions, fuel depots and logistics centres."^[15][16] USF commander Robert "Madyar" Brovdi similarly told Reuters: "The aim is to deprive the Kremlin of the ability to use Crimea as a springboard for new offensive operations."^[15]

By May 2026, Ukrainian drones had become highly effective at targeting and destroying Russian military supply trucks all over M14 and M18 highway stretches, earning it the nickname "Highway of Death",^[1][6][7][8] or "Highway to Hell".^[12][10] The motorway became a prime target for the 412th Unmanned Systems Brigade ("Nemesis") and other Ukrainian UAV units during the "middle strike campaign" of early 2026.^[1][2] Reportedly, the fixed-wing U.S.-made Hornet drones and Ukrainian-produced Morrigan drones have been significantly involved in striking Russian military trucks on the road.^[1]

On 25 May 2026, an Institute for the Study of War (ISW) report noted that "Ukraine significantly intensified its intermediate-range strike campaign against dynamic targets in Spring 2026 in order to degrade Russian logistics at operational depths ahead of a planned Ukrainian manoeuvre."^[12] Both Russian officials and milbloggers were confirming "in mid-to-late May 2026 that Ukrainian drones were increasingly targeting Russian vehicles and logistics … at distances over 160km from the frontline."^[12] By geolocation, the ISW was able to verify approximately 35 attacks on vehicles on the motorways M14 and M18, as well as the H20 between Mariupol and Donetsk, with circumstantial evidence suggesting the real number was much higher.^[12]

On 29 May, OSINT monitoring group Tochnyi managed to "geolocate 55 strikes on Russian logistics vehicles in April and 130 strikes in May, with the number increasing on a daily basis."^[2] A 31 May Kyiv Independent analysis of video footage of Hornet drones, released by the 1st Azov Corps alone (since mid-April), was able to confirm more than 50 strikes on key logistics corridors, including the R-280.^[2]

According to a June 2026 article by the Kyiv Post, about 5,000-8,000 Ukrainian drone operators and maintainers were involved in the middle strike campaign,^[5] targetting the supply lines that about 250,000 to 300,000 "Russian ground forces occupying Ukraine's Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Crimea regions are dependent on."^[5] The Russian forces mostly fell under the command of the 5th and 8th Combined Arms Armies.^[5] Most Ukrainian USF forces consisted of 300 to 500 personnel, who would launch at most 30 to 40 one-way attack drones plus a smaller number of reconnaissance drones per strike package.^[5]

Ukrainian formations involved in the middle strike campaign:

• Unmanned Systems Forces of Ukraine (USF or SBS)^[1][5]
  • 1st Center of the Unmanned Systems Forces (for SEAD/DEAD)^[5]
  • 413th Regiment of Unmanned Systems ("Raid", split from the 1st USF Center in 2024, for Russian drone warehouses and SEAD/DEAD in Berdyansk and Mariupol)^[5]
  • 20th Unmanned Systems Brigade ("K-2", for anti-logistics operations in northern Crimea)^[5]
  • 412th Unmanned Systems Brigade ("Nemesis", for the R-280 highway)^[1][2][5]
  • 414th Unmanned Strike Aviation Brigade ('Birds of Madyar')^[5]
• Ukrainian Ground Forces
  • 1st Separate Assault Regiment^[1]
  • 475th Assault Regiment "Code 9.2" [uk] (for bridges and causeways)^[5]
• Ukrainian Military Intelligence (HUR) (for fuel tankers on the R-280 highway^[2])
• National Guard of Ukraine
  • Pilum Regiment of the 1st Corps of the Ukrainian National Guard "Azov"^[2][5]

Ukrainian drones (mostly one-way attack drones, including loitering munitions) frequently used in the middle strike campaign:

• Morrigan:
  • 2 metre-long lightweight fixed-wing drone, operated by the 412th Unmanned Systems Brigade ("Nemesis")^[1]
• Dart 250:
  • c. 2,000 USD^[13]
• Hornet:
  • 5 kilogram warhead,^[13] range of 150^[1] or up to 200 kilometres,^[13] cost (up to) c. 5,000 USD, operated by the Pilum Regiment of the 1st Azov Corps^[13][2][5]
• Behemoth [uk]:^[13][5]
  • heavy, anti-bridge warhead, less than 50,000 USD,^[13] operated by the 475th Assault Regiment "Code 9.2" [uk]^[5]
• FP-2:
  • heavy, anti-bridge warhead, operated by the 475th Assault Regiment "Code 9.2" [uk]^[5]

On 19 June 2026, French OSINT statistical analyst Clément Molin noted an intensification of Ukraine's medium-range strike campaign, reaching a rate of 30 struck targets a day on Russian supply lines in occupied Crimea and southern Ukraine.^[17] For 22 June, Molin counted 47 successful drone attacks, and for 22 June 56 successful strikes.^[17] From 19 to 23 June, the total of Russian trucks and other pieces of military equipment (including bridges, crossings, trains and railways) on the highways was counted as 193, with the total number of such targets successfully attacked since early May 2026 estimated at nearly 800.^[18] Molin attributed this to the increasing effectiveness, availability, deployment of Ukrainian drones on the one hand, versus the "typically sluggish response" of the Russian military,^[17] a shortage of classic short-range air defence systems within the Russian military to equip mobile anti-air defence teams^[17] to protect the supply lines (only on key roads, not detours^[18]), and the effectiveness of Russia's radars and electronic warfare systems being undermined due to systematic Ukrainian targeting.^[18] The Russian mobile anti-air defence teams assigned to protect the supply lines have themselves become the target of Ukrainian drone strikes,^[18][13] and have much more frequently been observed to flee,^[17] or forced to abandon their positions,^[18] rather than successfully counter-attacking and shooting down incoming Ukrainian drones.^[17][18]

The 22 June 2026 ISW report noted that Molin verified footage confirming at least 500 Russian trucks and vehicles in occupied Ukraine hit by Ukrainian attacks between 1 May and 18 June 2026, and that 270 of such attacks had been confirmed using geolocation since January 2026, most of them between 1 May and 18 June 2026.^[19][20] It also invoked Meduza's observation that Ukrainian forces shifted focus from "heavily targeting sections of the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway in southwestern Donetsk Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast" in May "westward toward occupied Kherson Oblast and occupied Crimea" in June.^[19][20] The ISW observed geolocated evidence of at least 210 Ukrainian intermediate-range strikes in occupied Ukraine in all of May, versus 145 from 1 to 22 June,^[19][20] noting that some intermediate-range strikes were now being redirected to Russian rear areas in the Pokrovsk, Kostiantynivka, and Sloviansk directions.^[20] Apart from the Kerch Bridge in the east, at least ten Ukrainian attacks were carried out against seven other bridges connecting Crimea to mainland Ukraine in the north in a single week in mid-June 2026.^[15][21]

On 2 July 2026, Foreign Policy painted a grim picture of Russian losses on the Highway of Death due to Ukraine's ongoing middle strike campaign:

Hundreds of burned-out and charred wrecks of tractor trailers, tanker trucks, and assorted military transports line the shoulders of Russia’s chief supply route to Crimea and occupied southern Ukraine from Russia proper. Mile after mile of vehicle carcasses lie overturned and jackknifed in roadside ditches, supply transports that never reached their destination. This 390-mile stretch—the most direct route from the Russian supply hub of Rostov-on-Don to the Black Sea region—has earned itself the moniker “Highway of Death,” assigned to it by Ukrainian and Russian soldiers.^[22]

As a result of the strikes, in late May 2026, Russian occupying authorities almost completely closed off the road to all civilian traffic.^[12][1] The Russian-appointed governor of Kherson Oblast, Vladimir Saldo, restricted civilian truck movements on the R-280 on 21 May.^[1][2] In early June 2026, the Chonhar Bridge across the Syvash on the M18 was heavily damaged by Ukrainian drone strikes, prompting the Russian military to close that fixed link off as well.^[1] In its stead, on 7 June, Russia reopened the pontoon bridge near the damaged bridge, first laid in 2023 when the Chonhar Bridge was hit by a Storm Shadow missile; after it was repaired, the pontoon bridge had not been used in three years.^[10] Similarly on 6 June 2026, the Russian-appointed governor of Luhansk Oblast also restricted passenger and commercial traffic on highway R-150 through Luhansk to Mariupol.^[11]

On 9 June 2026, commander Robert "Madyar" Brovdi of the 414th Unmanned Strike Aviation Brigade ("Birds of Madyar") reported that Russian military cargo traffic along the highway of death had fallen by 71% during the previous two weeks.^[1][13]

As a result of the middle strike campaign, significant shortages of commodities, most notably fuel supplies, arose in Crimea,^[1][12][10] as well as parts of occupied mainland Ukraine.^[2] In late May, the emerging fuel crisis already caused inhabitants of occupied Melitopol in southern Kherson Oblast and Mariupol in southern Donetsk Oblast to post footage on social media of soaring fuel prices and long queues at filling stations.^[2] By late May, the Russian-appointed governor of Sevastopol reported that filling stations in the city were running out of petrol as well, while diesel was only sporadically available.^[2] Before fuel sales were rationed by coupons, the price of petrol in Sevastopol had reportedly risen by 50% compared to the average petrol price in Russia.^[23] Fuel rations were first introduced in Crimea on 30–31 May. By early June, residents of occupied Crimea also voiced complaints of kilometre-long queues at petrol stations, where authorities have introduced coupons limiting the sale of gasoline at 20 litres per person.^[10] Videos filmed by residents and shared on social media confirmed claims of such kilometre-long queues.^[23] Public transportation across Crimea was reduced in order to save fuel.^[10]

As early as 8 June 2026, the National Resistance Center of Ukraine claimed that residents of Crimea were also reporting shortages in supplies specific food products, including sugar, salt, pasta, grains, and flour, due to supply chain disruptions caused by the Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian logistics routes. Petro Andriushchenko, head of the Center for the Study of Occupation, similarly observed: "Following a series of strikes on the R-280 Novorossiya motorway and the logistics infrastructure of the land corridor to Crimea, fuel shortages began to gradually give way to supply shortages of certain goods."

Some retailers began restricting product sales to individual customers. For example, the Telegram channel Crimean Wind (Krimsky Viter) reported on 8 June that Crimea's PUD retail chain had introduced restrictions on the sale of several products, including butter, pasta, grains, flour, and water. One Dobrostroy shop in occupied Crimea may have begun limiting customers to three bottles of vegetable oil and three packets of pasta per person as early as 6 June. These measures heightened fears amongst the population.

Some specific food shortages may have been the result of panic-buying (or hoarding) rather than supply chain disruptions, as sugar was reportedly sold out across multiple shops in Sevastopol around 23 June.^[23]

In subsequent weeks, more videos appeared of burnt-out Russian supply trucks and tankers that journalists managed to geolocate to the highway between Melitopol and Crimea.^[25] One Russian military blogger acknowledged that "Petrol tankers and lorries are regularly set alight" by Ukrainian drones attacking the land corridor; "One by one, the links connecting the peninsula to the mainland are being severed."^[25] A Kyiv Post review of battle video footage, unit statements and open source reports concluded that from 1 to 18 June alone, "hundreds of fuel trucks" driving on occupied territory had been destroyed by Ukrainian mid-range drones.^[5]

On 21 June, the oil terminals in the Port of Kerch and Port Kavkaz were both struck and heavily damaged by Ukrainian drones,^[13][26][15] while the three remaining large road ferries on the Kerch Strait were all hit, catching fire and subsequently put out of service by the occupation authorities.^[13][26][15] In addition, Ukrainian forces struck Russian radar systems near Kurortne and west of Kerch.^[26] The impact of these attacks made the situation so dire that the Russian-appointed government of Crimea banned all fuel usage by ordinary citizens and business, restricting availability only to government agencies.^[25][27] Also on 21 June, the Kremlin-appointed governor of Sevastopol decreed that public transport, shops, supermarkets, restaurants, bars, and cafes in the city were allowed to operate only by day, and had to close at 8 p.m., while street lights were kept off at night to save power, and thus fuel.^[13][23]

Summer camps for children had also been cancelled across Crimea from late June until 1 September 2026 by order of Sergey Aksyonov.^[27][23][15] Almost 400 planned children's holiday camps throughout Crimea were thus cancelled, along with other major events.^[15] Some trains bringing Russian children to Artek summer camp in Gurzuf were stopped mid-way, with one passenger reporting that the "Artek" kids seemed to have been pulled off the train in a hurry, "[leaving] all their food and snacks behind."^[23] Another Ukrainian drone strike on the Crimean Bridge on 22 June 2026 damaged it, further disrupting traffic and logistics across that route.^[27]

On 23 June, the Crimean occupation authorities' spokesperson Oleg Kryuchkov stated: "There is still no real breakthrough that would allow us to say that petrol will be available at filling stations next week. The situation is quite difficult. A decision has now been made to supply fuel only to emergency services and services responsible for essential functions, including food distribution groups."^[28] Due to the fuel shortage, each ministry only had one service vehicle at its disposal "for the prompt resolution of urgent tasks", while no other vehicles were used.^[28] "At the moment, Ukraine's Armed Forces are regulating fuel supplies to Crimea," Kryuchkov said.^[28] Around the same time, reports surfaced of power outages in several urban centres in Crimea (including for backup generators), along with increasing fuel shortages and residents resorting to cycling whenever possible to avoid having to use their cars.^[23] Also on 23 June, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak stated that the Russian federal government was considering a "total ban" on exports of diesel, after previously halting exports of petrol and jet fuel.^[23] These measures were not just in response to the Crimean situation, but the wider Russian fuel crisis since 2025 due to Ukrainian long-range strikes on Russian oil refineries, including in Tuapse (16 April 2026) and Perm (26 April 2026).^[23]

At the same time, existing logistical problems in the occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts were exacerbated by the Ukrainine middle strike campaign on the M14, the extended "R-150" from Russia to Luhansk, Donetsk and Mariupol, and other transport links critical for Russia's occupation logistics.^[23] Ever since a water pipeline carrying drinking water from the river Donets to the city of Donetsk was destroyed during the 2022 Russian Donbas offensive, the city had faced water shortages, which worsened when water supply trucks on the highway were increasingly taken out by Ukrainian drone strikes in May and June 2026.^[23] A Donetsk city resident told BBC News in late June 2026: "People are just getting by... water comes once every three days. There's very little petrol, and it's the most expensive in the country. Drinking water has to be bought."^[23] There were very few cars on the streets anymore, and "everyone who could and did want to leave has already done so".^[23] He added that prices were rising, the range of available goods was shrinking, and that elderly people, children and people living in refugee centres were becoming particularly vulnerable.^[23]

On 24 June 2026, Ukrainian drones managed to strike the old Simferopol Thermal Power Plant [uk; ru] (built in 1958) and Sevastopol's main electric substation, further disrupting the power grid and leaving large parts of Crimea without electricity.^[13] On 20, 22 and 25 June 2026, the new Taurida Thermal Power Plant [uk; ru] (built in 2018–2019) was also hit by successive Ukrainian drone strikes.^[29][30] Finally, the other new Balaklava Thermal Power Plant [uk; ru] (built in 2018) was damaged by UAV attack on 25 June.^[30]

On 25 June 2026, the Kremlin-appointed city governor Mikhail Razvozhayev of Sevastopol announced further restrictions on how much electricity residents across the city were allowed to use, as Sevastopol was continuously plagued by power outages.^[27] Air raid sirens had become more regular occurrences in Sevastopol, sometimes multiple a day.^[27] While public transport was still running, petrol stations no longer sold any fuel.^[27] This led to public transport such as trolley buses being overwhelmed and overloaded, since no one could get to work using their private vehicles anymore.^[27] Several videos appeared from Simferopol, showing empty streets and public spaces that were usually full of cars and other vehicles.^[27] Another video posted on 24 June 2026 showed empty shelves in a local supermarket after cafes and canteens closed down, indicating the beginnings of food shortages.^[27] This was due to the fact that food supply businesses could no longer acquire fuel to transport their food products to retailers and markets across Crimea.^[27] In a 25 June interview, Razvozhayev also said that power restrictions had been implemented, intended to avoid overloading the Sevastopol power grid, although this caused several water supply outages due to a lack of electricity.^[31]

One attempted counter-measure by the Russian military as of late June 2026 has been to escort groups of tanker trucks with mobile anti-aircraft teams, with many soldiers on anti-drone duty.^[13] The Kyiv Independent commented on 25 June: "It doesn't seem to have helped much, as videos of numerous Russian logistics vehicles being destroyed by the Unmanned Systems Forces and a host of other Ukrainian military units are published on a daily basis. The mobile anti-aircraft teams themselves are frequently victims of Ukraine's prowling drones."^[13]

On 26 June, the Russian occupation authorities of Crimea and Sevastopol issued a joint declaration of a state of emergency.^[31] The stated goal was to "streamline economic issues", such as restoring energy facilities, securing operational management and essential supply purchase, as well as providing financial compensation for residents whose essential appliances were damaged due to power surges.^[31]

On 15 June, The Moscow Times reported news from tour operators, hotels and wineries reporting a surge in booking cancellations of Russian tourists wanting to spent holidays in Crimea.^[32] Given that about 80% of tourists normally travelled to Crimea by car, increasing (concerns over) fuel shortages prompted thousands of would-be tourists to reconsider their vacation plans.^[32] Industry representatives estimated 70~90% of trips booked for June had been cancelled, as well as about half of all reservations for July and August 2026.^[32] As the economy of Crimea had become heavily dependent on the tourism industry from Russia ever since the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, a flop of the 2026 holiday season could mean a serious blow for the republic's economy.^[32]

On 22 June, the Russian Union of Travel Industry acknowledged that holidays bookings to Crimea had fallen by 58% in the previous two weeks compared to the same period in June 2025, concluding that the 2026 tourist season had been effectively derailed.^[15][33] The cancellation of almost 400 summer camps for children, as well as other major events, greatly contributed to Russian tourists avoiding Crimea for the summer of 2026,^[15][33] while children at summer camps that had already begun would all be sent home.^[33]

By 24 June, growing traffic jams of hundreds of vehicles trying to leave Crimea via the Kerch Bridge were reported.^[15][31] NRC commented on 25 June: "The Crimean Bridge may still be open for passenger traffic, but it has become a magnet for traffic jams. According to public sources, on Wednesday [24 June] there was a queue of more than eight hundred vehicles waiting to leave the peninsula for Russia – travellers are warned to expect a waiting time of around three hours. The delays are mainly caused by thorough security checks."^[15] Satellite images taken that day suggested the traffic jam was over 10 kilometres long, with Radio Svoboda estimating the involvement of 1,500 vehicles.^[35]

While a guesthouse owner in the holiday resort town of Novyi Svit claimed on 25 June that tourists from Russia were still arriving and were "cautious, not panicked",^[27] other Russian tourists complained about a complete lack of fuel in Crimea, with one woman from Russia recommending travelling with their own fuel rather than trying to refill on the peninsula.^[23] Other Russian tourists decided to cut their holidays short, and leave Crimea, while Russian military bloggers expressed increasing concerns about the peninsula's situation.^[13] By the evening of 25 June, independent Russian Telegram channel Astra concluded from OSINT analysis that the traffic jam on the Kerch side had grown to at least 15 kilometres.^[34]

On 26 June, the ISW quoted a Crimean Telegram channel as saying that, after the Crimean Bridge was closed down for 6 hours following a Ukrainian drone strike on the night of 25–26 June, a long queue of about 2,450 vehicles on the Kerch side of the Crimean Bridge, while no lines were observed on the Taman side, indicating that thousands of people were trying to leave Crimea towards Russia.^[31] The ISW estimated that "people leaving occupied Crimea likely include Russian tourists or residents of occupied Crimea, Russian military and security personnel associated with the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF), and occupation administrators."^[31] Ukrayinska Pravda instead quoted the "Krymsky Most: Operativnaya Informatsiya (Crimean Bridge: Operational Information)" Telegram channel as saying 750 vehicles were waiting on the Taman side (waiting time: about three hours), while 1,750 vehicles were waiting on the Kerch side (waiting time: over four hours).^[36] The Bridge was closed again for two hours on the night of 26–27 June, with occupation authorities claiming Russian forces had to intercept attacking Ukrainian drones first.^[37]