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The Baháʼí Faith began in Persia during the 19th century with the coming of the Báb and Bahá’u’lláh. These two prophetic figures  each came with a specific mission, the Báb’s being to prepare the way for a Promised One expected by all the world’s religions, and Bahá’u’lláh’s to inaugurate a new era in which humanity will live as one united family. Bahá’u’lláh’s teachings, which include the harmony of science and religion, the equality of women and men, the abolishment of prejudice, independent search for truth and the oneness of humanity, offer a framework for the establishment of a world civilisation which encompasses both the material and spiritual aspects of life.[1]

The Qajar kings and clergy of Persia viewed the popularity of the Báb’s teachings as a threat to their authority and power, as a result of which thousands of the Báb’s followers were killed, with the Báb himself executed in 1850. However, as Bahá’u’lláh’s message spread both within Persia and further afield, the orthodox clergy renewed their efforts to wipe out the new religion and force its adherents to return to Islam. When Bahá’u’lláh was exiled, the persecution of his followers continued in Persia.[1]

Baháʼís continue to be persecuted in various countries, including Iran,[2] where there is still a large Baháʼí population.[3]

Historical context

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The Báb declared his mission in Persia in 1844 during the Qajar Dynasty (1789–1925). From 1844 - 1853, opposition to the Bábis was led by the Shi’a clergy who were driven by a belief that the religion was a challenge to and an infringement of Islam, and who feared for their livelihoods and standing. When in 1848 the clergy procured support from the state, the Bábis responded by defending themselves in situations where they were assured of sufficiently large numbers, and enduring the suffering when they didn’t.[4]

To begin with the mullas tried to stop the spread of the Bábi religion by condemning the believers as enemies of God and apostates, resulting in torture, public executions and mass attacks. Efforts by the Bábis to defend themselves resulted in the engagement of troops by the government, with heavy casualties on both sides. The Báb’s imprisonment from 1846 until 1850 resulted in a public execution, and when in 1852 there was a failed attempt from two Bábís to kill the Shah in revenge, the result was a large scale massacre of over 20,000 Bábís, including 400 Shí'i mullas who had become followers of the Báb.[5]

The writings of Baháʼu’lláh challenged various deep-rooted doctrines of Shí'i Islam, including the equality of women and men, the formation of a world federal government, the inclusion of 'Western sciences in the school curriculum, and the independent investigation of truth. He also stated that there is no longer a need for a priesthood, thus calling into question the existence of the Shí'i ecclesiastical structure with its extensive financial network sustained by fees, ecclesiastic offices and endowments. In cities and villages where the clergy were strongly influencial, the mullas used their power in order to provoke attacks on the Baháʼís, a situation which lasted until the Qájár dynasty was overthrown in 1925.[5]

Between 1853 - 1921 persecutions tended to be local, initiated by governors or clerics more for personal gain in regard to prestige or wealth than for religious purposes, since with no protection from any European powers the Baháʼís were in a vulnerable position. By following Baháʼu'lláh’s instructions to desist from defending themselves, the Baháʼís demonstrated their peaceful intentions and their obedience to the government.  From circa 1882 not only did the central government cease the persecution of Baháʼís, but looked upon any harassment initiated by local clerics with disapproval. During the 1920s it was the state which instigated attacks on the Baháʼí community, and from around 1934, by using the excuse that the Baháʼí Faith wasn’t a religion, Baháʼí  institutions such as schools, administrative establishments and holy places were attacked, with believers being imprisoned for getting married and fired from employment in the government. During the reign of Muhammad Ridá Sháh, from 1941—79,  by using the fear of communism as an excuse, the clerics felt empowered to take action against the Baháʼís, including false accusations of lawbreaking. Whereas previously the  Baháʼís had submitted themselves to persecution, this time they endeavoured to persuade the police and courts to take responsibility and protect them, reaching out to international bodies when that failed. When the Islamic revolution in 1979 enabled the clerical class to gain political power they used their new found autonomy to attack and persecute the Baháʼí community freely through every means they could think of in an attempt to bring them down.[4]

Iran

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The Iranian constitution which was drafted during the Iranian Constitutional Revolution in 1906 set the groundwork for the institutionalized persecution of Baháʼís.[6] Whilst the constitution was modelled on Belgium's 1831 constitution, the provisions guaranteeing freedom of worship were omitted.[7] Subsequent legislation provided some recognition to Zoroastrians, Jews and Christians as equal citizens under state law, but it did not guarantee freedom of religion and "gave unprecedented institutional powers to the clerical establishment."[7]

Following the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran after the Iranian Revolution, the constitution officially recognized four religions: Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam,[2] with adherents of the first three minority religions being granted certain legal protections under Iranian law. These include exemptions from some Islamic legal restrictions such as the prohibition of alcohol, and guaranteed seats in parliament for representatives of several minority communities.[2]

However, religious freedom in Iran is far from absolute. Conversion away from Islam (apostasy) is forbidden, with both converts and missionaries risking prison.[2] Those seeking to start a new religious group (whether Muslim or not) face severe restrictions.

The Baháʼí Faith faces an additional, technical hurdle. Iranian law recognizes all those who accept the existence of God and the prophethood of Muhammad as Muslims. Baháʼís accept both of these precepts; however, Baháʼís recognize the Báb and Baháʼu'lláh as additional messengers who have appeared after Muhammad, thus denying finality of prophethood of Muhammad.[8] Muslims, on the other hand, assert the finality of Muhammad's revelation. Iranian law therefore treats Baháʼís as "heretics" rather than members of an independent religion, as they describe themselves.[5]

Other unrecognized Iranian religious minorities include the Ahl-e Haqq, the Mandaeans and Azalis. According to the government of Iran, Non-Muslims comprise less than 2% of Iran's population.[9]

Early 20th century and the Pahlavi Dynasty

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Political context

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At least one scholar has described Baháʼís in Iran prior to the Islamic Republic as "a political pawn".[10] Government toleration of Baháʼís being in accord with secular Western ideas of freedom of worship was "a way of showing mullahs who was boss." Correspondingly, since the Baháʼís were a relatively small minority and most Iranians followed traditional beliefs of Apostasy in Islam, when the government was politically weak and in need of clerical support, withdrawal of government protection to "allow active persecution of the Baháʼís," was a "low cost pawn that could be sacrificed to the mullahs". Thus during the heyday of secular ruler Reza Shah Baháʼís were protected; however, in 1955, when Reza Shah's son, Mohammad Reza Shah, required clerical support for the Baghdad Pact and with the 1953 Iranian coup d'état only two years past, Baháʼís were attacked.[11]

History

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Starting in the twentieth century, in addition to repression that impacted individual Baháʼís, centrally-directed campaigns that targeted the entire Baháʼí community and institutions were initiated.[6] Some of these persecutions were recorded by missionaries who were in the areas at the time of the massacres.[5] In one case in Yazd in 1903 more than 100 Baháʼís were killed.[12] In the 1930s Baháʼí schools, such as the Tarbiyat boys' and girl's schools in Tehran, were closed, Baháʼí marriages were not recognized, attacks were made in the Iranian press, access was denied to government jobs, and Baháʼí literature was censored.[13][6]

Due to growing nationalism and economic problems, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi relinquished certain religious affairs to the clergy of the country, the resulting power sharing resulting in a campaign of persecution against the Baháʼís. Akhavi has suggested the likelihood that by orchestrating a movement against the Baháʼís the government had hoped that it could serve to obscure the fact that revenues obtained by the distribution of oil from western oil companies was going to be too low for the growing nationalistic sentiment; it would also serve to gain the support of the clergy for their foreign policy.[14] They approved and coordinated the anti-Baháʼí campaign to incite public antagonism against the Baháʼís which began in 1955, and included the spreading of anti-Baháʼí propaganda in national radio stations and official newspapers.[6]

During the month of Ramadan in 1955, populist preacher Sheikh Mohammad Taqi Falsafi, began a high profile campaign against the Baháʼís.[6] Having received permission from the Shah to express anti-Baháʼí rhetoric in his sermons, he encouraged other clergy to do the same,[15] causing mob violence against the Baháʼís. As a result Baháʼí properties were destroyed, Baháʼí centres were looted, Baháʼí cemeteries desecrated, and Baháʼís were killed, some hacked to pieces; Baháʼí women were abducted and forced to marry Muslims, and Baháʼís were expelled and dismissed from schools and employment.[5][6] During the third week of the sermons the National Baháʼí Centre in Tehran was occupied by the military and its dome later destroyed.[6] The Minister of the Interior, Amir Asadollah Alam, wrote in his memoirs:

Falsafi managed to fool both the Shah and the military authorities and start a campaign against the Baháʼís that dragged the country to the edge of disaster. It was Ramadan. [Falsafi's] noon sermons were broadcast throughout the nation via radio and caused violence and terror in many locations. People killed a few Baháʼís here and there. Falsafi justified these acts by saying that they increased the Shah's prestige. I had no choice but to order him, in my own rash way, to refrain from giving further speeches until order was reestablished.[16]

Despite an attempt by the government to put a stop to the inflammatory sermons, Falsafi carried on until the end of Ramadan.[6] Throughout the 1950s the clergy continued initiating their repression of the Baháʼí community, their efforts checked by government ministers who, despite being sympathetic to the anti-Baháʼí sentiment, feared that the violence would rapidly escalate and cause international criticism.[14]

The 1950s also saw the foundation of the fundamentalist Islamic organization, Hojjatiyeh, its central aim being to combat the Baháʼí Faith.[17] Members of the group entered Baháʼí communities, with Baháʼí arrests, imprisonments and executions often being attributed to members of Hojjatiyeh having access to Baháʼí registration books.[17] Hojjatiyeh was also believed to have cooperated with SAVAK, the Iranian government's intelligence agency which gathered information concerning the religious affiliation of Iranian citizens with the aim of attacking the Baháʼís.[6]

Eliz Sanasarian states that while many Iranians blamed the Baháʼí persecution on Hojjatiyeh, which was the most visible anti-Baháʼí force, the silent Iranian majority couldn't "avoid personal and communal responsibility for the persecutions of the Baháʼí in this extreme manner. To provide tacit support, to remain silent, ... do not excuse the majority for the actions based on prejudice and hate against an Iranian religious minority group."[17]

In the late 1970s the Shah's regime consistently lost legitimacy due to criticism that the Shah was pro-Western, and as the anti-Shah movement gained ground and support, revolutionary propaganda circulated stating that some of the Shah's advisors were Baháʼís.[18] Baháʼís were portrayed as being an economic threat and supporters of Israel and the West, and the prevalence of hatred of the Baháʼís increased.[6][19] When the Islamic revolution in 1979 enabled the clerical class to gain political power they used their new found autonomy to attack and persecute the Baháʼí community freely through every means they could think of in an attempt to bring them down.[4]

Islamic Revolution and Republic

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The 1979 Islamic Revolution has refocused the persecutions against the Baháʼí Faith. Amnesty International and others report that 202 Baháʼís have been killed since the Islamic Revolution (see below),[20] with many more imprisoned, expelled from schools and workplaces, denied various benefits or denied registration for their marriages.[5] Additionally, several Baháʼí holy sites were destroyed in the revolution's aftermath, including the house of the Báb in Shiraz, the house of Baháʼu'lláh at Takur (in Mazandaran), and the resting place of Muhammad-Ali Barfurushi (Quddús) in Tehran.[5]

The Islamic Republic has often stated that arrested Baha'is are being detained for "security issues" and are members of "an organized establishment linked to foreigners, the Zionists in particular,"[21] but according to Bani Dugal, the principal representative of the Baha'i International Community to the United Nations, "the best proof" that Baháʼís are being persecuted for their faith, not for anti-Iranian activity "is the fact that, time and again, Baha'is have been offered their freedom if they recant their Baha'i beliefs and convert to Islam ..."[21]

During the Iranian revolution attacks against the Baháʼís increased. In 1979 Hojjatiyeh members took over the Baháʼí National Centre in Tehran and other cities and expelled staff and seized personnel files and membership lists.[22] These files were later used by Hojjatiyeh including sending flyers in the mail warning Baháʼís of the consequences of continuing to believe in the Baháʼí beliefs.[22] Also, once again, there were reports of mob attacks, arson, and deaths and murders against the Baháʼís across Iran; 22 Baháʼí cemeteries as well as hundreds of Baháʼí homes and businesses were damaged or destroyed.[6] During December 1978 in Sarvestan, a city south of Shiraz, it was reported that several hundred Baháʼí houses were set on fire, and more than 1,000 Baháʼís were left homeless.[23] Reports of the attacks suggest that they were not spontaneous, but that they were initiated by the military government appointed by the Shah, that SAVAK provided the addresses for Baháʼís, and when the army showed up they did not take action to prevent the fires from spreading.[6] Further attacks happened throughout the country including Baháʼís who would not recant being fired at and having their homes destroyed; the violence continued even after the Shah fled Iran.[6]

Islamic Republic

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After the Shah left Iran on January 16, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini returned on February 1, 1979, and started the process of creating a new government. During an interview before returning to Iran with Professor James Cockroft, Khomeini stated that Baháʼís would not have religious freedom:

Cockroft: Will there be either religious or political freedom for the Baháʼís under the Islamic government?
Khomeini: They are a political faction; they are harmful. They will not be accepted.
Cockroft: How about their freedom of religion– religious practice?
Khomeini: No.[24]

The new government's spokesman in the United States said that while religious minorities would retain their religious rights emphasized that the Baháʼís would not receive the same treatment, since they believed that the Baháʼís were a political rather than religious movement.[25] Bazargan, the provisional prime-minister, while being emphatic that all Iranians would enjoy the same rights, insisted that the Baháʼís were a political movement and would not be tolerated.[6]

During the drafting of the new constitution the wording intentionally excluded the Baháʼís from protection as a religious community.[26] Referring to the recordings of the proceedings of the official transcripts of the constitution drafting process, Sanasarian states that anti-Baháʼí thought was obvious as there was haggling "over every word and expression of certain articles to assure the exclusion of the Baháʼís."[27] The final version of the constitution explicitly withheld recognition from the Baháʼís by stating in Article 13 that the "Zoroastrian, Jewish and Christian Iranians are the only recognized religious minorities..."[6] Responding to international criticism due to the exclusion of the Baháʼís, spokesmen for the government stated, as before, that the Baháʼís were a "misguided group... whose affiliation and association with world Zionism is a clear fact"[28] and that "Baháʼísm is not a religion, but a political doctrine."[29]

Starting in late 1979 the new government of the Islamic Republic of Iran systematically targeted the leadership of the Baháʼí community by focusing on the Baháʼí National Spiritual Assembly (NSA) and Local Spiritual Assemblies (LSA). In November 1979, Ali Murad Davudi, the secretary of the NSA, was kidnapped and never seen again.[30] In August 1980 all nine members of the National Spiritual Assembly were arrested while meeting at a private home.[6] In a statement on September 10, 1980, then speaker of the House Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, stated that an order for the arrests of the Baháʼís had been issued, but by October 9, 1980, Rafsanjani changed his statement and said that no members of the NSA were arrested.[6] There has been no further news regarding the nine NSA members since their arrest in 1980, and their fate remains unknown, although there are reports that they were at some point held in Evin prison; they are now presumed dead.[6] After the disappearance of the NSA members, the Iranian Baháʼí elected a new NSA. On December 13, 1981, eight of the nine new NSA members were arrested by the Iranian authorities, and were executed on December 27, 1981, without trial.[6]

In addition to the execution of the members of two National Spiritual Assemblies, the members of Local Spiritual Assemblies throughout the country were also killed. Between April 1979 and December 1980 at least eight prominent Tehran Baháʼís were killed. In September 1980 in Yazd, fifteen Baháʼís were arrested, and after a graphic trial that was partially televised, seven of the Baháʼís were executed; the remaining eight were released after four months.[6] In Tabriz in 1979 two prominent Baháʼís were executed and then in 1981 all nine members of the Tabriz LSA were executed. In Hamadan seven members of the LSA of Hamaden were executed by firing squad, and while the bodies were being prepared for the funeral it was found that six of the men were physically tortured before their death.[6] In Shiraz between 1978 and 1981, the House of the Báb, a Baháʼí holy place, was destroyed, five prominent Baháʼís were executed, and more than 85 Baháʼís were arrested for interrogations; then in 1983 sixteen more Baháʼís were executed.[6] The Baháʼís were also a target during the 1981–1982 Iran Massacres.[31]

On August 29, 1983, the government announced a legal ban on all administrative and community activities of the Baháʼí community, which required the dissolution of the third National Spiritual Assembly and about 400 Local Spiritual Assemblies.[6] The Baháʼí community complied with the ban, but the former members of the LSAs were routinely harassed, and seven members of the third NSA were eventually arrested and executed.[6]

Secret memorandum

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In February 1991, a confidential circular[32] issued by the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council on "the Baháʼí question" and signed by Supreme Leader Khamenei himself, signaled an increase in efforts to suffocate the Iranian Baháʼí community through a more "silent" means.[2][5][33][34] The document organized the methods of oppression used to persecute the Baháʼís, and contained specific recommendations on how to block the progress of the Baháʼí communities both inside and outside Iran.[5] The document stated that the most excessive types of persecutions should be avoided and instead, among other things recommended, that Baháʼís be expelled from universities, "once it becomes known that they are Baháʼís," to "deny them employment if they identify themselves as Baháʼís" and to "deny them any position of influence."[2]

The existence of this so called Golpaygani Memorandum was brought to the attention of the public in a report by the then UN Human Rights Commissioner Mr Galindo Pohl (E/CM4/1993/41, 28 January 1993),[32] and the policy recommendations of the document are still in force.[5][33]

Statements

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Since the later part of the 20th century many third party organizations have made statements regarding the persecution of Baháʼís asking that human rights be maintained. To date, the United Nations, Amnesty International, the European Union, the United States, Brazil, Australia, New Zealand, Austria, Canada, UK, Germany, France, Netherlands, Ireland, Hungary, Norway and India have made official statements condemning the treatment of Baháʼís abroad, in particular, in Iran.[117]

The United Nations and the United Nations Commission on Human Rights have published reports on the persecution of the Baháʼís since the Iranian Revolution in 1979; in every year since 1984, except for 2002, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights has passed a resolution expressing concern about human rights violations against the Baháʼís in Iran.[5] The Special Representative on Iran, Professor Galindo Pohl, Canadian Jurist and UBC Law Professor, Maurice Copithorne, and the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance, Professor Abdu'l Fatah Amor, have all reported on the persecutions that the Baháʼís have faced in Iran. For example, in 1995 the commission wrote that "... the Baháʼís, whose existence as a viable religious community in the Islamic Republic of Iran is threatened ..."[118] and in November 2005 they wrote that "... the escalation and increased frequency of discrimination and other human rights violations against the Baháʼí [sic], including cases of arbitrary arrest and detention, the denial of freedom of religion or of publicly carrying out communal affairs, the disregard of property rights, the destruction of sites of religious importance, the suspension of social, educational and community-related activities and the denial of access to higher education, employment, pensions, adequate housing and other benefits ...".[119]

Amnesty International has also documented the persecution of the Baháʼí community in Iran. For example in 1998 it gave statements regarding the execution of a Baháʼí prisoner: "Amnesty International unreservedly condemns the execution of Ruhullah Rouhani and fears that he was executed for the nonviolent expression of his beliefs. Amnesty International currently knows of seven cases of Baháʼí prisoners under the sentence of death and is calling for commutation of these and all other death sentences without delay"[120]

The European Union in the 2004 EU Annual Report on Human Rights wrote:

There has not been discernible progress in the key areas of concern. Concern was also reiterated at the destruction of the Baháʼí holy site at Babol and the refusal of the authorities to allow the dignified re-interment of the remains it contains.[121]

Then in a speech given at the European Parliament in October 2005 on behalf of the European Commissioner for Education, Training, Culture and Multilingualism, Jan Figel said:

Regarding the actual situation of human rights in Iran, there is a growing cause for concern. There are other serious issues of concern which have emerged recently: ... the arrest of members of the Baháʼí Faith.[122]

The United States Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor stated in the 2004 Report on International Religious Freedom that "The Government harasses the Baháʼí community by arresting Baháʼís arbitrarily,"[123] that "the property rights of Baháʼís are generally disregarded, ... the Government has confiscated large numbers of private and business properties belonging to Baháʼís,"[123] and that "Public and private universities continue to deny admittance to Baháʼí students"[123]

The Iranian government responds to these statements by saying that Baháʼís are enemies of the state, were supporters of the former Shah's government and spies employed by imperialist governments of the West.[5] The Ayatollah Khomeini, even before his return to Iran said in an interview that he believed that Baháʼís were traitors — Zionists — and enemies of Islam.[124]

The Iranian representative to the United Nations tried several times, albeit unsuccessfully, between 1982 and 1984 to convince the United Nations diplomatic community that the Baháʼí Faith is a politicized organization with a record of criminal activism against the Iranian government[5] and not a legitimate religion like Judaism, Christianity, and Zoroastrianism which are protected under Iranian law;[33] Iran has not acknowledged that the Baháʼí Faith is a religion.[33] The United Nations responded to the Iranian government's accusations by stating that there has been no evidence of Iran's claims and that the Baháʼí community in Iran professes its allegiance to the state. The United Nations pointed to the Baháʼí teaching of obedience to the government of one's country and stated that any involvement in any subversive acts against the government would be antithetical to precepts of the Baháʼí religion.[20] The United Nations also stated that if the Iranian government did acknowledge that the Baháʼí Faith is a religion, it would be an admission that freedom of religion does not apply to all in Iran and that it is not abiding by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International Covenants on Human Rights to which it is a signatory.[33]

There are many Iranians who have published how and why Iranians think of Baháʼís as outsiders. Dr. Mohammad Tavakoli, a Muslim-Iranian, who is a Professor of Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Toronto presents in Iran-Nameh, a Persian language academic journal, a study that examines the processes that led to the ghettoization and eventual "othering" of the Baháʼís in Iran by the political and religious forces within Iranian society.[125]

Egypt

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In 1925, Egypt became the first Islamic state to legally recognize the Baháʼí Faith as an independent religion apart from Islam. Despite a historically active Egyptian Baháʼí community during the early twentieth century, Baháʼí institutions and community activities have been banned since 1960 by Law 263. This law was decreed by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, seven years after the founding of the Arab Republic of Egypt. All Baháʼí community properties, including Baháʼí centers, libraries, and cemeteries, were confiscated by the government. The current Egyptian Baháʼí community, estimated to number between several hundred and two thousand, has also had fatwas issued against it by Al-Azhar's Islamic Research Center, which charges Baháʼís with apostasy.[126]

In January 2001, 18 people, mostly Baháʼís, were arrested in the city of Sohag under the pretence of having violated Article 98(F) of the Penal Code ("insulting a heavenly religion") and other possible charges, 10 of whom were held in detention for over 10 months without being formally charged.[127]

During and since the 2011 Egyptian revolution tensions have remained high, including homes being burnt,[128] though Baháʼís made ongoing efforts to contribute to the dialog.[129] Since 2011 Baháʼís while hopeful remain concerned[130] and a Salafi spokesman has said of Baháʼís "We will prosecute the Bahai's (sic) on the charge of treason."[131]

Identification-card controversy

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The Egyptian identification card controversy began in the 1990s when the government modernized the electronic processing of identity documents, which introduced a de facto requirement that documents must list the person's religion as Muslim, Christian, or Jewish (the only three religions officially recognized by the government). Consequently, Baháʼís were unable to obtain government identification documents (such as national identification cards, birth certificates, death certificates, marriage or divorce certificates, or passports) necessary to exercise their rights within the country unless they lied about their religion, which conflicts with Baháʼí religious principles.[132] Without documents, they could not be employed, educated, treated in hospitals, travel outside of the country, or vote, among other hardships.[132]

In 2006, a Baháʼí couple’s request to have their religion recorded on their official documents and those of their children sparked a major national debate on freedom of religion. On 4 April 2006, an administrative court ruled that the state had to issue the couple identity cards correctly mentioning the Baháʼí Faith, even though it was not officially recognized. Under pressure from religious and political critics, the government appealed, and on 16 December 2006, the Supreme Administrative Court overturned the ruling and upheld the policy limiting identity documents to the three recognized religions.[133]

Following a protracted legal process culminating in a court ruling favorable to the Baháʼís, the interior minister of Egypt released a decree on April 14, 2009, amending the law to allow Egyptians who are not Muslim, Christian, or Jewish to obtain identification documents that list a dash in place of one of the three recognized religions.[134] The first identification cards were issued to two Baháʼís under the new decree on August 8, 2009.[135] Under this compromise solution, the Baháʼí Faith is still unrecognized by the government – Islam, Christianity, and Judaism remain the only recognized religions.

Following the 2011 Egyptian revolution and comments by Dr. Ibrahim Ghoniem, acting Minister of Education and a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, in late 2012 it appeared that the Egyptian school system might exclude Baháʼí children and call into question the settlement of the identification-card controversy.[136]

Burial and funeral rights

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In recent years, Egyptian Baháʼís have also reported restrictions affecting funeral and burial rights. Because the Baháʼí Faith is not officially recognized in Egypt, Baháʼí families have faced difficulties obtaining designated burial grounds outside Cairo, and some have had to transport deceased relatives long distances to the community’s only functioning cemetery in the capital.[137] In 2022, Egypt’s Supreme Administrative Court rejected a petition seeking to require local authorities in Alexandria to allocate a burial site for Baháʼís,[138] while human rights submissions to the United Nations have described the continued denial of burial grounds as part of a wider pattern of discrimination against the community.[139]

Personal status, and marriage rights

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By 2025, the 1960 decree remained in force, and institutional discrimination against Baháʼís had continued and recently intensified, particularly in matters of marriage, burial, and legal personality.[140] According to human rights organizations, administrative and religious authorities have refused to recognize Baháʼí marriages, leading to the annulment of unions, the registration of individuals as “single” in civil-status records, and the indirect deprivation of family rights connected to filiation, inheritance, and social security.[141]

The Baháʼí International Community and several UN special rapporteurs have reported cases in which Baháʼís were denied the registration of their marriages, access to appropriate cemeteries, or recognition of their associations, and have warned of a new phase of systematic violations targeting the minority.[142][143] International media have also reported recent rulings confirming the refusal to recognize Baháʼí marriages, raising concerns about Egypt’s compliance with its international commitments regarding freedom of religion and equality before the law.[144]

Other countries

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Africa

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During the late 1970s, the Baháʼí Faith was banned in a number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Burundi, 1974; Mali 1976; Uganda 1977; Congo, 1978; and Niger, 1978).[145]

Algeria

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In late 1968, Baháʼí pioneers were expelled from Algeria, during the period of the independence of Algeria when the country adopted Islamic practices in rejection of colonial influences.[146] Activities of the Baháʼí Faith were banned in Algeria in 1969.[145]

Morocco

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In Morocco there were episodes of religious persecution in 1962–1963, when 15 Baháʼís were arrested for their religious convictions; three were given death sentences and several others were sentenced to years of prison terms at hard labour.[147] There were months of diplomatic efforts; US Senator Kenneth B. Keating stated in the U.S. Senate on February 18, 1963, "How far religious freedom under the Moroccan Constitution really applies, will be revealed in the coming weeks when the appeal before the Supreme Court [of Morocco] is heard."[148] On March 31, 1963, during a visit to the United States and the United Nations, King Hasan of Morocco was interviewed on television and addressed the audience saying that even though the Baháʼí Faith was "against good order and also morals", he would pardon the death sentences.[148] Persecution of Baha'is occurred again in 1984, and their response was to seek diplomatic redress emphasizing the non-partisanship and the obedience to government principles of the religion.[145] Baháʼís have more recently been denied passports and can practice their religion only in private.[149]

Asia

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Afghanistan

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Baháʼís were persecuted and imprisoned in Afghanistan during the rule of the Taliban. After the fall of the Taliban, one Baháʼí was arrested and the court has ruled that the Baháʼí Faith is not a recognized religion and therefore, Baháʼís have no rights under Islamic law.[150]

Azerbaijan

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In Azerbaijan, a region that has some of the earliest connections with the Baháʼí Faith, there have been several news stories covering severe social, bureaucratic and legal limits on religious communities, including the Baháʼís, since the fall of the Soviet Union. Baháʼís are trying to recover properties that were confiscated in the 1930s.[151] In 2004, Tavachur Aliev, a Baháʼí, claimed to have been arrested for mentioning his religion and was released when he promised not to mention his religion again.[152] Furthermore in 2006, laws were being considered that would curtail the rights and privileges of Baháʼís and other religious minorities.[153]

India

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The Baháʼís of Jaipur registered a complaint with police that their community burial ground had been attacked by a mob of about 40-50 people "led by a sarpanch", or head of the local gram panchayat, on Friday, October 31, 2015, about 11:30am in Shri Ram Ki Nangal village.[154] The Hindu newspaper claimed the Sarpanch was Nathu Jangid, head of the village government, a member of the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party based on a witness statement.[155] Baháʼí community leaders have termed it the "first" such incident in India against their community.[154]

Indonesia

[edit]

Banning orders have been made against Baháʼí activities in Indonesia (especially but not exclusively 1962–2000).[156][157]

While the government gave Baháʼís the freedom to exist as an organization in 2000,[156] the national registration system continues to restrict the religious freedom of persons who do not belong to the five officially recognized faiths;[158] thus Baháʼís cannot register their marriages or their children's births.[157] Couples prevented from registering their marriages or the births of their children in accordance with their faiths must either convert to one of the five recognized faiths or misrepresent themselves. Those who choose not to register their marriages or their children's births risk future difficulties; for example, many children without a birth certificate cannot enroll in school or may not qualify for scholarships and individuals without birth certificates cannot qualify for government jobs.[157]

Muslims who converted to the Baháʼí Faith in Sulawesi were intimidated by their neighbors and by the local government in 2007. Of seven households who converted, two returned to Islam, four refused to change, and the other ignored requests to convert again.[159]

In August 2014, the Indonesian government officially recognized the monotheistic faith as a religion, and the then Religious Affairs Minister Lukman Hakim Saifuddin's made a statement that Baháʼí worshippers will be protected by the Constitution.[160]

Iran

[edit]

On December 1, 2022, the US House of Representatives passed House Resolution 744, which condemns the Iranian government for persecuting the Baháʼí faith. The House Resolution 744 intends to point out the violation of human rights that are committed against the faith.[161]

Iraq

[edit]

A 1970 law prohibits the Baháʼí Faith in Iraq. A 1975 regulation forbade the issuance of national identity cards to Baháʼís until it was rescinded in 2007, but after only a few identity cards were issued to Baháʼís, their issuance was again halted.[162]

Qatar

[edit]

Since at least the early 2000s, Qatari authorities have applied a policy of state-sponsored discrimination against Bahá’ís, marked by intimidation, refusal of dialogue, and the absence of effective avenues of redress for the community. Bahá’ís in Qatar have reported blacklisting, deportations, non-renewal of residency permits, employment discrimination, and restrictions affecting family unity and religious life.[163][164]

On March 31, 2021, Qatari authorities blacklisted and deported a prominent Qatar-born Baháʼí, Omid Seioshansian, on "unspecified criminal and national security charges." Over the years many Baháʼís have been blacklisted and deported from Qatar. Once blacklisted, Baháʼís are expelled from the country and are permanently refused reentry. Residency permits of non-Qatari Baháʼís have also been denied, or not renewed.[165][166]

In 2025, Human Rights Watch reported that between 2003 and 2025 it had documented at least fourteen expulsions of Bahá’ís from Qatar. The organization stated that these expulsions were presented as public-order measures but were in fact based solely on religious affiliation, causing family separations, loss of employment, and bans on return through blacklisting.[167] In July 2025, UN experts expressed grave concern about discrimination against the Bahá’í religious minority in Qatar, including reports of arbitrary detention, lack of clear legal basis for arrests or detentions, and failure to provide written explanations, contributing to a climate of fear that discouraged victims from speaking publicly.[168]

In August 2025, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom condemned the five-year prison sentence imposed on Remy Rowhani, a prominent Bahá’í in Qatar, for allegedly promoting a belief that “raises doubts” about the fundamental principles of Islam. USCIRF described the charge as an unfounded blasphemy accusation and an alarming restriction on freedom of religion or belief, placing the case within a broader pattern that included non-renewal of residence permits, destruction of a Bahá’í cemetery, employment discrimination, and family separations.[169] Remy Rowhani was ultimately acquitted on appeal.[170]

In April 2026, the Bahá’í International Community warned of a wave of expulsions affecting more than 40 percent of Bahá’ís residing in Qatar, describing the campaign as the “religious erasure” of a minority that had been present in the country for decades. According to the organization, the non-renewal of residence permits and other administrative pressures formed part of a long-standing pattern of discrimination, including imprisonment, family separations, and denial of employment. The Bahá’í International Community called on Qatari authorities to end the expulsions and respect Qatar’s constitutional guarantees on freedom of belief.[171]

Uzbekistan

[edit]

In Uzbekistan, Baháʼís have been subject to raids[172] and expulsions.[173]

Vietnam

[edit]

Between 1975 and 1992, the government of Vietnam forbade the open practice of the Baháʼí Faith, which appears to have precipitated a sharp drop in membership.[174]

Yemen

[edit]

According to reports from the Bahá’í International Community, Human Rights Watch, and other sources, persecution of the Bahá’ís in Yemen began in 2008 when Sanaa authorities detained several believers and deported others.[175] The harassment intensified after 2013 with the arrest of Hamed Kamal bin Haydara on fabricated espionage charges. In 2017, Ahmed Shaheed, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, said that the persecutions in Yemen mirrored those in Iran.[176][177] Following the Houthi takeover of Sanaa in 2014, the repression became systematic, including mass arrests during a 2016 educational event.[178] According to a report by the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, the Houthi movementan armed religious-political grouptriggered Yemen’s civil war in 2015 after rebelling against the government. It has since been accused of fostering sectarian divisions and repressing the country’s small Bahá’í community.[179] In 2018, bin Haydara was sentenced to death, and Bahá’í institutions were dissolved—a move widely condemned by international organizations.[177][179] Despite a conditional pardon and release of several Bahá’ís in 2020, harassment continued. A renewed crackdown in May 2023 saw 17 Bahá’ís detained during a peaceful gathering; although all were released by August 2024, many remained subject to travel bans and restrictions on religious activity.[176]

Europe

[edit]

Germany

[edit]

The Baháʼí Faith was banned by authorities in Nazi Germany in 1937.[180]

Romania

[edit]

Romania has had a Baháʼí community since 1926, whose members at that time included Marie of Edinburgh, Queen of Romania.[181] After the fall of communism in Romania, the Romanian Baháʼí community organized itself in order to form its first National Spiritual Assembly in 1991.[182] In 2005 the Romanian Baháʼí community numbered some 7,000,[181] but in January 2007 a law was passed that imposed restrictive requirements on religious communities that wished to be recognized by the government, which Baháʼís and adherents of other minority religions could not meet.[181] Some of the restrictions include waiting as long as twelve years after petitioning before a religious community can start to apply for recognition and the requirement that a legally-recognized religion must have over 22,000 members.[181]

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]
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