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Water supply and sanitation in Yemen
Data
Access to an improved water source55% (2014)[1]
Access to improved sanitation53% (2014)[1]
Continuity of supplyMostly not continuous
Average urban water use (L/person/day)Between 37 (in Taiz) and 94 (in Aden)[2]
Institutions
Decentralization to municipalitiesYes
National water and sanitation companyBeing phased out (NWSA)
Water and sanitation regulatorPlanned
Responsibility for policy settingMinistry of Water and Environment
Sector lawYes (2002), focused on water resources
No. of urban service providers15

Water supply and sanitation in Yemen are characterized by multiple challenges as well as some achievements. A key challenge is severe water scarcity, especially in the Highlands, prompting The Times of London to write "Yemen could become the first nation to run out of water".[3] A second major obstacle is a high level of poverty, making it very difficult to recover the costs of service provision and infrastructure maintenance. Access to baseline water supply and sanitation in Yemen is as low as, or even lower than that in many sub-Saharan African countries. Yemen is both the poorest country and the most water-scarce country in the Arab world. Third, the capacity of sector institutions to plan, build, operate and maintain infrastructure is severely limited. Finally, the ongoing conflicts and instability make it even harder to improve or even maintain existing levels of service.

The average Yemeni has access to only 80 to 86 cubic meters of water per year (58-62 gallons per day) for all uses, far below the internationally defined threshold for absolute water scarcity of 500 cubic meters per year, and much lower than the Middle Eastern regional average.[4][5] Yemen's groundwater is the main source of water in the country, but the water tables have been severely depleted, leaving the country without a viable source of water. In the critical highland basins, including Sana'a and Taiz, the natural water tables are dropping by 1 to 8 meters each year. This has forced public and private well-drilling to reach deep fossil aquifers at excavation depths exceeding 1,000 meters in some areas.[6] The groundwater has not been regulated effectively by Yemen's governments.[7] Even before the conflicts, Yemen's water conditions were described as increasingly dire by experts, who worried that Yemen would be the "first country to run out of water".[8] Agriculture in Yemen takes up about 90% of water in Yemen even though it only generates 6% of the nation's GDP. However, a large portion of Yemenis are dependent on small-scale subsistence farming. About half of agricultural water in Yemen is used to grow khat, a psychoactive plant that most Yemenis chew. This means that in such a water-scarce country as Yemen, where half the population is food-insecure, 45% of the water withdrawn from the ever-depleting aquifers is used to grow a narcotic crop rather than addressing widespread food insecurity.[7][6]

Following the 2015 Yemeni Civil War, the water shortage situation became increasingly dire, causing a widespread humanitarian and public health crisis. Between 14.4 million and 17.8 million people—about half of whom are children—struggle to access safe water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) services.[9] Fighting has forced millions of internally displaced Yemenis to relocated. Consequentially, wells in these areas went under increasing pressure.[10] Additionally, water infrastructures, including municipal pipelines and coastal desalination plants, were targeted during the conflict. For example, on January 8, 2016, a major desalination plant in the city of Mokha was destroyed by a Saudi bomb, which caused the disruption of water supply not only in Mokha but also in Taiz.[11] Centralized power grid failures and the high cost of fuel have heavily damaged public pumping stations, forcing more than 70% of the population to rely entirely on expensive, unregulated private water markets and mobile water tankers.[12] Additionally, global warming and human overpopulation have also been contributing to the destruction of Yemen's water supply.[13] This persistent lack of clean drinking water and functional sanitation utilities directly triggered serious public health emergencies, including historically severe outbreaks of cholera and waterborne illnesses. Over 2000 people died from the highly contagious bacterial infection in the four months from April to August 2017.[14][when?] To prevent a total cessation of public networks, international aid operations have managed to partially bypass the collapsed grid by transitioning urban and rural pumping stations to decentralized solar energy systems.[9]

Access

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In 2014, around 11.2 million people lacked access to "improved" water, while around 11.5 million people did not have access to "improved" sanitation in Yemen.[15][1]

In 2012, 55% of the total population had access to "improved" water, devided as 72% of the urban population and 47% of the rural population. As for sanitation, in 2012, 53% of the total population had access to "improved" sanitation, (93% of the urban population and 34% of the rural population).[15]

Running water is available in many parts of the country, but most villages remain have no access to it. Women in remote areas typically draw water from wells or from cisterns, sometimes walking up to two hours each way twice a day. They may carry the water in pots on their heads or load them onto donkeys.[16]

Statistics on access to water supply and sanitation in Yemen are contradictory. For example, the data from the latest census, carried out in 1997, are very different from data in a Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) carried out in the same year. According to the census, 61% or urban households had access to water connections in their home, while according to the DHS the same figure was 70%, but for rural areas the order is reversed. The census gives higher figures for access to house connections (25%) than the DHS (19%). The latest data used by the United Nations are from the 2004 Family and Health Survey and the 2006 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey. Estimates for 2011 are made based on an extrapolation of trends from previous years.[17]

In 2011, the United Nations' Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation (JMP) estimated that only 55% of the Yemeni population had access to improved water source – including 40% from house connections and 15% from other improved water sources such as standpipes. Only 53% had access to improved sanitation. Access to improved water supply, using a broad definition of access, is estimated to be much higher in urban areas than in rural areas (72% vs. 47%). The urban-rural gap is much higher for improved sanitation (93% vs. 33%). Because of the rapid population growth, access to water supply actually declined in relative terms from 66% in 1990 to 55% in 2011 despite a substantial increase in absolute access. However, access to improved sanitation increased from 24% to 53% during the same period, according to the estimates.[18] By 2012, this baseline remained similar, with 55% of Yemenis maintaining access to improved water (72% urban, 47% rural) and 53% holding access to improved sanitation (93% urban, 34% rural).[1] By 2014, around 11.2 million people lacked access to improved water, and approximately 11.5 million people did not have access to improved sanitation.[1]

Impact of conflict on current access (2020s)

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The escalation of armed conflict undid historical gains, causing structural collapse across both urban and rural water networks. According to United Nations humanitarian assessments, more than 17.8 million people inside Yemen lack sufficient access to safe water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) services, half of whom are children.[19] The complete decay of centralized public utilities has forced over 70% of the population to rely entirely on expensive, unregulated private water markets, mainly by mobile water tankers and informal neighborhood commercial wells.[20]

Rural communities remain severely affected by the war. In remote villages which don't have pipe systems, the physical work of water collection continues to fall mainly on women and children, who need to travel up to two hours each way to draw water from vulnerable wells or old cisterns. This dynamic is one of the factors that contributes to high school dropout rates among rural girls.[21] Because of the loss of centralized electrical grids and no public financing, the sustainability of remaining localized water services relies largely on international aid interventions, which focus on switching local city and village networks to decentralized solar-powered pumping systems to keep minimal water supplies functioning.[19]

Service quality

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Service quality for water supply and sanitation has several aspects. For example, water supply service quality can be measured by the continuity of supply, which is generally low in Yemen, or customer satisfaction, which is high. One indicator of the service quality of sanitation is the effectiveness of wastewater treatment plants in removing pollutants, which is often low in Yemen.

Continuity of water supply

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In the town of Mahwit, piped water comes less than once a week.

Continuity of water supply is poor in most Yemeni cities, and has been deteriorating into a severe crisis due to ongoing conflict and infrastructure decay.

Pre-war baseline (2007–2008)

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According to a survey performed in 2007 by the Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE), municipal water deliveries have been highly intermittent.[2] For example, in Taiz, public piped water is delivered only about once every 40 days. More and more people had to rely on more costly water supplied by private wells and water tankers. The quality of this water was questionable because these tankers were often cross contaminated.[22] According to MWE, in 2007 only 15 out of 23 urban water utilities reported providing water daily for between 12 and 24 hours. However, these metrics did not distinguish between continuous supply and intermittent moderate (more than 12 hours daily water) supply. The 15 utilities were included in cities like Sana’a and Aden, which provide intermittent water supply. Four other towns provided water on a daily basis, but for less than 12 hours per day. During this period, the city of Ibb and the town of Bajil provided water only once a week, with utilities in Taiz and Mahwit delivered water less than once a week. There were conflicting data about the continuity of supply. For example, MWE reported that water was being provided daily in Amran in 2007,[2] while 100% of the respondents to a household survey living there indicated that they had access to water weekly or even monthly in 2008.[23]

Systemic collapse and current status (2026)

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Following years of armed conflict, state neglect, and fuel blockades, the remaining operational capacity of Local Corporations (LCs) of potable water has severely collapsed. By 2026, the average per capita share of annual renewable freshwater in Yemen dropped to between 80 and 86 cubic meters—much less than the international absolute water scarcity threshold of 500 cubic meters. Groundwater in critical highland basins, including Sana'a, Saada, and Taiz, is being pupmed at twice the natural replenishment rate, causing local water tables to drop by up to 6 meters each year, and forcing public and private well-drilling to reach increased depths.[24]

Centralized power grid failures and the elevated cost of diesel fuel have eventually eliminated relatively reliable municipal pipeline continuity. To prevent a total cessation of water supply, international humanitarian interventions by agencies such as the World Bank and UNOPS switched dozens of urban pumping stations to decentralized solar energy networks in municipalities like Al-Shihr, Dhamar, and Amran.[25][26]

Despite the efforts to solarize the water infrustructure, overall degradation remains severe. Many people in the cities still rely on more expensive water supplied by unregulated private wells and mobile water tankers, the quality of which is problematic due to improper tank cleaning. Distribution of water by pipes in cities remains poor; Taiz remains the most severely affected major area, where public piped water is delivered sometimes once every 30 to 40 days. The lack of continuous clean water has left an estimated 14.4 million people in need of urgent Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) humanitarian assistance.[27]

Customer satisfaction

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Historically, public satisfaction with urban water utilities was very high despite poor delivery schedules. According to a survey carried out in 2008 in 7 towns, 88% of the customers of water utilities reported that they were satisfied with the service level of their water utility, and only 9% were dissatisfied. Even in the city of Ibb, where water supply is intermittent, 47% of customers declared they were satisfied. In the town of Amran, where the situation was similar, even more customers - 74% - were satisfied. It may be that customers have become accustomed to poor service quality and have correspondingly lowered their expectations.[23] 77% of households said that they drank tap water.[23]

Following the outbreak of the civil war and the breakdown of municipals piped infrastructure, Yemenis can no longer rely on tap water. Because public utilities are widely non-active or highly irregular, urban Yemenis have been forced into an almost total dependence on commercial private water trucks and unregulated local neighborhood wells. Public satisfaction has dropped sharply as a consequence of high private water pricing, which burdens a large portion of average household income, combined with growing public health concerns regarding chemical and bacterial contamination inside unmonitored private supply chains.[28]

Wastewater treatment

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Yemen has historically operated more than 17 urban and more than 15 rural wastewater treatment plants. They were using the following technologies:

According to a 2002 report by staff from the Yemeni Environment Protection Agency, there were also wastewater treatment plants in Taiz, Dhamar, Yarim, and Radaa. Most of the plants use the stabilization pond technology. The largest wastewater treatment plant in the country, located in Sana'a, was completed in 2000, but it had to be upgraded between 2003 and 2005 due to "deficiencies in its operation, unacceptable odor emissions, and inadequate management of the generated sludge".[30] While data on the quality of treated effluent are limited, available data showed that the effluent of at least two plants complied with the relatively lenient national standard of 150 mg/L of Biological oxygen demand, a measure of organic pollution. However, none of the four analyzed plants complied with the standard for fecal coliform, a measure of biological contamination. Reuse of treated and untreated wastewater in agriculture is common in Yemen.[31] Furthermore, hazardous wastewater from hospitals and medical laboratories is discharged into the sewer system, but cannot be adequately treated in the existing municipal wastewater treatment plants.[32]

Conflict-Era Operational Status (2015–Present)

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After years of armed conflict, military damage in some places, and fuel blockades, the structural integrity of Yemen's wastewater sector severely collapsed.[33] Extended central electrical grid failures and high diesel costs routinely forced total operational shutdowns of critical plants, including the Sana'a facility.[34] The resulting overflow of raw, untreated sewage into public spaces and agricultural valleys directly increased historic outbreaks of waterborne diseases, and even triggering a severe national cholera epidemic.[33][34]

To prevent total collapse of the infrastructures , humanitarian interventions led by agencies such as the World Bank and UNOPS have started shifting several remaining installations—such as the Zabid and Aden infrastructure toward decentralized solar-diesel hybrid networks to maintain minimal operational safety standards.[35]

Water resources

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Sana'a, the capital of the Republic of Yemen, is supplied entirely by groundwater, with water levels declining by 6–8 m per year

With renewable water resources of only 80 cubic meters per capita/year Yemen is one of the most water-scarce countries in the world.[36] This level is far below the threshold for water stress, which is defined at 1,700 cubic meters per capita/year.[4] Water demand continues to dramatically exceed the renewable resources, thus leading to a steady decline in groundwater levels, varying between 1 m per year in the Tuban-Abyan area and 6–8 m per year in the Sana’a basin.[37] Today, there are between 45,000 and 70,000 unregulated wells in Yemen, the majority are under private control, most of which were drilled without license.[38] Agriculture takes the main share of Yemen's water resources, using nearly 84 percent, and it is estimated that khat production accounts for 30 percent of all water used in irrigation.[39]

Furthermore, climate change has significantly increased rainfall variability and accelerated extreme weather patterns across Yemen. For example, in Sana'a the average rainfall declined by one sixth from 240mm (average 1932–1968) to 200mm (1969–1982) and 180mm (1983–2000).[40] Current global climate models indicate a shift to more intense, unpredictable rain events. This climate fragility is characterized by longer, hotter dry periods alternating with destructive flash floods, which might harm local traditional water infrastructure rather than filling the country's depleted aquifers.[41]

Sana'a

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Sana'a could be the first capital city in the world to run dry.[42] Since 2000s, many wells had to be drilled to depths of 2,600 to 3,900 feet (790 to 1,190 m), which is extremely deep by world standards. While the combined output of the 125 wells operated by the state-owned Sana'a Local Corporation for Water Supply and Sanitation historically barely met 35 percent of the growing city's need, protracted conflict, grid failures, and fuel shortages have severely harmed public infrastructure. Consequently, the vast majority of the population relies entirely on expensive, unregulated private networks and mobile water tankers. To combat deteriorating groundwater quality, privately owned kiosks that use reverse osmosis to purify poor-quality groundwater supplies mushroomed in Sana'a and other towns. Long-term technical proposals, such as pumping desalinated water from the Red Sea across 155 miles (249 km), over 9,000-foot (2,700 m) mountains into the capital, itself located at an altitude of 7,226 feet (2,202 m). The enormous pumping cost would push the price of water up to $10 per cubic meter.[38]

The Minister for Water and the Environment, Abdulrahman al-Eryani, said in 2007:

The Sana’a basin is using water 10 times faster than Nature is replenishing it. And before long there won’t even be enough to drink. I am not an optimist. I think many of the city's people will simply have to move away. The solution I am proposing is a very clear policy—a voluntary one—of reallocating people from here down to the Red Sea coast. We could use renewable energy there to desalinate sea water. And it would be cheaper than trying to provide enough water to Sana'a. This is not the first time that Yemenis have had to move to avoid disaster. It's happened many times in the last few thousand years, when Nature allowed the population to increase rapidly. This time, though, there are political frontiers in the way of an exodus.[43]

Other localities

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"Along the coast between Mukalla and Aden a number of fishing villages are supplied by water within a half mile of the shore. The water levels are a few feet above mean sea level and probably represent wedges of freshwater floating on sea water (Ghyben–Herzberg principle). The freshwater probably originated from the higher ground behind the coastal plains by slow seaward movement, and partly from natural precipitation."[44]

In the Tuban Delta and the temporary capital of Aden, aquifers near the coasts are approaching exhaustion, with electrical conductivity and salinity levels in municipal wellfields (such as Bir Nasser and Bir Ahmed) already exceeding national drinking water standards. To prevent total collapse, international development agencies have started feasibility studies to transition Aden toward solar-powered seawater desalination.[45]

The city of Taiz suffers from one of the most severe water crises in the country. Widespread damage to public infrastructure, and the destruction of critical municipal wellfields due to armed conflict, forced the complete shutdown of the public water network. Residents are almost entirely dependent on local initiatives, such as: expensive private water trucking, and a single over-extracted valley water source (Al-Dhabab), which covers only a small fraction of the city's total demand.[46]

Groundwater near the city of Ibb is polluted by leachate from a landfill,[47][48] while water fields in other low-lying peri-urban areas face a lot of biological and chemical contamination from the unregulated disposal of untreated industrial and domestic wastewater.[49]

History and recent events

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Sector reforms (1995–2008)

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The Yemeni water and sanitation sector underwent important changes between 1995 and 2008, with most significant changes occurred between 2000 and 2003. Decentralization, commercialization and community participation were key principles of these reforms. In 2003 the Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE) was established, to take responsibility for water supply and sanitation from the former Ministry of Energy and Water (MEW). This was seen a sign of political commitment to tackle the challenges Yemen faces in the water sector.[2] In 2005 the government adopted the National Water Sector Strategy and Investment Program, to increase cooperation between the Ministries of Water and Agriculture, as well as between donors. Through the process of joint annual reviews these ministries, their agencies and donors evaluate progress.[38] The changes affect urban water supply and sanitation, rural water supply and sanitation, as well as water resources management.[50]

Despite institutional challenges, achievements were made in the sector around the turn of the millennium. Wide-ranging reforms were carried out, which were supported by substantial international donor funding. These reforms decentralized urban service provision to commercially managed local corporations. The utilities substantially increased tariffs to improve cost recovery margines. While the service rates rose, water remains affordable with a minor increase of water and sewerage fees, respresenting about 1.1% of total household expenditures. By comparison, the average monthly spending on the widely used stimulant qat is about eight times time higher than the combined water and sewer bill.[51][52] Between 1995 and 2008, about 2.8 million Yemenis gained access to improved water source and approximately 7.5 million to improved sanitation.[53] In a survey carried out in 2008 across seven towns, 89% of the customers of water utilities reported satisfaction with the service delivery, and only 9% were dissatisfied.[23] In Sana'a, the collection efficiency of water and sewer bills increased from 60% to 97% during the same period.[51] However, it declined back to 60% in 2011, due to national political instability.[54][55]

Urban water supply and sanitation

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A small NWSA branch in Rada'a town, located in the Al Bayda' Governorate was selected as a pilot project to test the proposed reform. The principles governing this pilot, which referred to as the "Rada’a Model," included the following mandates:

  • The Branch operates independently of NWSA Head Office, while remaining accountable to NWSA for regulatory matters, and to the Minister of Electricity and Water for policy issues.
  • The Branch is accountable to the local community through a Local Advisory Committee, which monitors and reviews the Branch's activities.
  • The Branch manages its own tariffs and billing system, retaining revenues in local bank accounts, while contributing an overhead fee for regulatory services.
  • The Branch appoints the local staff, with exception of three key management positions, which are appoinnted by a Ministerial resolution on agreed criteria.
  • The Branch incentivizes employees based on performance, to supplement staff remuneration according to civil service pay scales.
  • The Branch is required to submit monthly operational reports, as well as quarterly and annual financial statements.
  • The Branch's accounts are subject to independent audits.[50][51]

In 2000, Local Administration Law No. 4 passed, promoting the decentralization of water services. The first local corporation was established in the Sana'a region in February 2000, followed by Aden in the same year. Five more local corporations were established in 2001 in Taiz, Hodeida, Ibb, Wadi Hadramaut and Mukalla. Local corporations in Hajjah and Al-Bayda' were established in 2005, and in 2006 they started operating in Sadah, Abyan, Lahj and Dhamar. Two more corporations were established in 2008 Amran and Ad Dali'.[51] As of 2009[update], more than 95% of the urban areas were served by 15 local corporations. In 2003, the newly established MWE introduced a Performance Indicators Information System (PIIS), which monitors and evaluates the urban water and sanitation service providers performance at the local and national levels.[2] A study was completed in 2006, based on which a bill was prepared to establish an independent regulatory agency. However, it it is still pending implementation.[51]

According to the Yemen Observer, "the process of decentralization was not smooth; it faced strong resistance from the central organization. Sustainable political will and endorsement of the local administration law helped to overcome these obstacles".[22]

The autonomy of the local corporations, however, remained limited. Important decisions such as the approval of tariff increases, investment decisions, and the selection of the General Manager of each Local Corporation still required the approval of the central government. Investments are financed by foreign grants channeled through the central government. Furthermore, the Boards of the local corporations often did not play an active role. For example, in Ibb the Board met infrequently, did not discuss the corporation's accounts and was reluctant to even discuss a tariff increase. In 2009 a study recommended to transform local corporations into public companies with clear business plans and more autonomy, but this recommendation was not implemented.[56]

Rural water supply and sanitation

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Concerning rural water supply and sanitation, in a Cabinet Decree (Decree #21 of November 22, 2000) the government ratified a Policy Statement, emphasizing the principles demand-responsiveness, decentralized community-based management and cost recovery. The General Authority for Rural Electricity and Water (GAREW) was responsible for promoting rural water supply and electrification at that time. In 2003 GAREW was also separated along sector lines and the GARWSP created for water supply.

Water Resources Management: 2002 Water Law

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In July 2002 Law No. 33 of 2002 was passed. It deals with water resources management, not with drinking water supply and sanitation. However, it provides a framework to preserve water resources that are essential for the sustainability of water services. An Arabic copy is available on the Yemeni Public Prosecutor's website,[57] together with a copy of the Environment Law No. 26 of 1995.[58] The context of the water law is described as follows:

“Historically, management of water resources in the Republic of Yemen has been inadequate, with some of the key problems being: water and property rights are not clearly defined; the problems of groundwater mining have led to abstraction rates that exceed recharge by about 80% on average, and in some places abstraction exceeds recharge by 400%; charges for water use are low, or non-existent; water usage is distributed 93% for irrigation purposes, 5% for domestic use, and 2% for industry, and political and economic upheaval over the past decade has resulted in limited institutional capacity, particularly to bring water demand in line with availability. As a major step forward in the process of securing improved water resources management, the Government of the Republic of Yemen has prepared a Water Law, which was ratified by the House of Representatives in July 2002.”[59]

National water conservation campaign (2008)

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In 2008 NWRA launched a national water conservation campaign in partnership with the German development organisation GTZ and the United Nations Development Programme. The campaign's figurehead was a cartoon character in the shape of a raindrop. His name, Rowyan, means "I've had enough water" in Arabic.[60]

Impact of the crisis since 2009

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Since 2009 the security situation in Yemen began to deteriorate, resulting in heavy fighting in different parts of the country and a change of government in 2011. The fighting has forced many people to flee their homes, such as tens of thousands of people who fled from Abyan to Lahej and who received emergency drinking water supplies from the international community.[61] Urban water supply throughout the country was affected by the interruption of power supply, lack of diesel fuel, insufficient backup generators, and a decline in revenues caused by the reluctance of consumers to pay their water fees.[54] In January 2012 the Minister of Water, Abdulsalam Razaz, said that the Ministry was owed over YR 33 billion (US$153 million) "by government bodies and people of power” and warned that it was "on the verge of bankruptcy". In addition, strikes caused chaos in the Ministry and its branches.[62]

In 2010, the General Rural Water Authority (GRWA) commissioned an assessment of existing rural water coverage. It recommended to focus on rainwater harvesting in Yemen's highlands, and on well drilling in the coastal and desert areas. But the ensuing political chaos prevented implementation of the recommendations. According to international aid organisations, the government of President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi has put little energy towards resolving the water crisis and "water was at the bottom of the list" of its priorities.[63]

Civil War

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Yemen's water conditions have deteriorated significantly since the start of the civil war in 2015. The blockade has prevented Yemenis from importing fuel, which is necessary to pump groundwater.[10] 20 million people are now in need of water and sanitation, a 52% increase since before the Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen started, and the price of water has increased so much that some families spend a third of their income on water. Since the regular means of supplying and storing water have been severely damaged by the bombing, Yemenis have resorted to collecting water in buckets when it rains. This situation has led to the spread of disease, including dengue and malaria.[64]

Devastation of Yemeni infrastructure, health, water and sanitation systems and facilities by Saudi-led coalition air strikes led to the spread of cholera.[65][66][67]

Saudi-led coalition airstrikes are deliberately targeting water systems in Yemen.[68]

Responsibility for water supply and sanitation

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Policy and regulation

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The Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE) is in charge of formulating water policies in Yemen. In the field of water supply and sanitation it is supported by a Technical Secretariat (TS) for Water Sector Reform. The government envisages to create an autonomous regulatory agency for the water and sanitation sector.

Four agencies report to the Ministry: The National Water Resources Authority (NWRA) for water resources management, the National Water and Sewerage Authority (NWSA) for urban water supply, the General Authority for Rural Water Supply (GARWSP) for rural water supply,[69] and the Environment Protection Agency (EPA).[70]

The National Water Resources Authority has set up a branch in Hadramaut, which includes the city of Shibam shown here

The National Water and Sewerage Authority (NWSA) provides technical assistance, establishes sector standards, organizes and implements training programs and establishes data bases for all local corporations until the establishment of a regulatory agency. In addition, it still provides water and sewer services in some urban areas.

The National Water Resources Authority (NWRA) has the mission to manage the nation's water resources on a sustainable basis, to ensure satisfaction of basic water needs by all but especially by the poor, and to establish a system of water allocation that is fair, yet flexible for meeting varying needs of economically and demographically dynamic sectors. NWRA has branches in Sana'a, Taiz, Sa'dah, Aden, Hadramaut and Hodeida.[71]

The General Authority for Rural Water Supply (GARWSP) provides support to water user associations in rural areas.

Service provision

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Urban areas

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As of October 2008,[update] 15 Local Corporations (LCs), 13 autonomous public utilities, as well as 16 local branches of NWSA provide services in urban areas.[51]

Local corporations provide services in the largest cities of the country: Aden, Hodeidah, Ibb, Mukalla, Sana'a and Taiz. They also provide services in 9 towns: Abyan, Amran, Al-Bayda', Ad Dali', Dhamar, Hajjah, Lahj, Sadah and Wadi Hadramaut. They thus serve the great majority of the urban population of Yemen. 15 of the 21 governorates of Yemen have a LC and the objective is to have one LC per governorate.[51]

Autonomous public utilities are typically affiliated to the local corporation in their governorate. They are cost centers within the LC. For example, the autonomous utility in Bait al-Faqih reports to the local corporation in Hodeidah, and the autonomous utility in Rada'a, where the reform process had been piloted, reports to the local corporation in Al/Bayda'. Two of the 15 autonomous utilities are still affiliated to NWSA. These two utilities—in Ataq, the capital of Shabwah Governorate, and in Al Mahwit—are located in governorates where there is no local corporation yet. They are in an intermediate state before becoming LCs. The Rada’a Principles apply to all autonomous public utilities.[51]

The local branches of NWSA include the smaller capital cities of governorates where there is neither a local corporation nor an autonomous utility yet. They include Ma'rib, Al Jawf and Al Mahrah as well as the newly established governorate Raymah. It is estimated that less than 5% of the urban population of Yemen live in the 16 local branches that remain with NWSA.[51]

Rural areas

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Services in rural areas are provided by thousands of community-based water committees. According to a 2000 World Bank report, at that time communities were insufficiently involved in water system design and government and donor-supported schemes usually fell short of developing effective community construction and management mechanisms. Water committees were imposed local institutions, often suffering from internal management conflicts, leading to negligence of operation and maintenance which resulted in frequent break-downs. More than 50 percent of systems were broken down. Systems were often over-designed, and users cannot afford paying the full cost of operating the schemes, let alone producing an operating surplus for the purchase of spare parts and major repairs. In addition, political and tribal leaders frequently demanded that the government allocates its resources to particular projects, thereby interrupting—even abandoning—the work of started schemes. According to a 1996 Review, there were several hundreds of incomplete projects at that time. Little was done in the area of hygiene education, safe drinking water storage, and wastewater and excreta disposal.

Most of the projects require some "contribution" of the beneficiaries, for example, an up-front down-payment towards investment costs (varying between 5 percent and 30 percent).

In 2007 the World Bank reported that a “Demand Responsive Approach (DRA) has been mainstreamed into all sub-sector interventions throughout the country and is used in all governorates”. Furthermore, a rural water strategy was finalized, agreed upon by all stakeholders and awaited cabinet approval in early 2008.[69]

Efficiency

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In 2011 the level of non-revenue water was estimated to be 32% in Sana'a, 33% in Aden, 22% in Taiz and 35% in Mukalla.[54] This is an improvement compared to previous levels. In 2001 non-revenue water was estimated to be around 50 percent.[72] According to the joint annual review of the water and sanitation sector for 2007, average non-revenue water was down to 28%. In Sana'a non-revenue water had declined from about 50% in 1999 to an estimated 38% in 2007.[51] In 2007, among the larger utilities the lowest level was achieved in Ibb with 20% and the highest in Hodeidah with 43%. The authors of the report caution that the data quality may be poor.[2]

All utilities suffer from overstaffing, but continue to recruit staff. The number of staff per 1,000 connections was 10 in 2000, while a level of less than five is considered as typical for an efficient utility.[72] In 2007, the number of staff per 1,000 connections varied between 5 and 20.[2]

Financial aspects

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Financial aspects of water and sanitation cover the financial sustainability of the entities that provide piped water supply and sanitation services, as well as the affordability of these services to households. Household expenditures for water include payments for water bought from private tanker trucks as well as the payment of bills for piped water.

Urban areas

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The accepted norm for cost recovery by the entities in charge of urban water supply and sanitation in Yemen is for the tariff to be set such that the operation and maintenance costs are recovered at the least, with the government and donors financing investments. However, in some cases, such as Sana’a, credits by international donors are on-lent to the utility.[51] A few utilities have been able to achieve full cost recovery. One example is the small town Bait al Faqih which has a new system and low losses, indicating a functional and efficient network, and no inherited staff and thus no overstaffing.[51] Collection efficiency, the share of bills actually paid, increased from 60% in 1999 to 97% in 2007.[51] However, in 2011 it declined again to about 60%.[54]

Municipal water tariffs in Yemen are differentiated based on three customer categories: domestic users pay the least, while commercial users as well as government entities pay more. All utilities use increasing-block tariffs, with the lowest block covering a consumption between 5 and 10 cubic meters per month and connection.[51]

The government has shown a willingness to raise tariffs, having done so in 1995, 1998, 1999 and 2001. Further increases have been undertaken subsequently by local corporations. From 1995 to 2001 the monthly bill increased over 350% for a domestic customer consuming 15 m3/month, and the industrial tariff increased over 150 percent per m3.[72]

As a result of the collapse of state institutions after war broke out, even more households than before have to rely on water bought from tanker trucks, who in turn buy water from well owners. According to the World Bank, in 2018, the cost of water supplied by tankers cost seven times the price of municipally supplied water in Sana’a. In Aden untreated water costs 25 times as much or US$7.30 per cubic meter. Treated, desalinated water costs as much as US$20 per cubic meter. The war-induced fuel crisis has driven up the price of gasoline, which made it more expensive to pump, transport and treat water.[73][74] Prior to the war, the share of the water bill for 5 cubic meter per month and household was between 0.5% and 1.1% of income of poor households for the 11 largest utilities in 2007. The share of the sewer bill was between zero and 0.7%. Water and sewer bills were thus highly affordable. The highest combined share of water and sewer bill was found in Sana'a with 1.6%.[2] The average share of total monthly household expenditure on water and sewerage was about 1.1%, which amounted to about YR 1,363, while the average monthly expenditure on qat was about eight times (YR 10,888) the amount paid for water, according to the household budget survey (2005–2006).[51]

Yemeni man chewing khat

Rural areas

[edit]

In 2000 the majority of rural water systems used some form of cost-recovery, either based on metered water use, or a flat rate.

External cooperation

[edit]

Prior to the war, the main donors for the water and sanitation sector were the World Bank, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the German Development Bank KfW, the German Technical Cooperation agency GIZ and the Netherlands. Other important donors included Japan, UNDP, DFID and the European Union. Since the outbreak of the war, agencies specialized on assistance during conflicts such as UNICEF have gained importance.

UNICEF

[edit]

UNICEF and its local partners provide water through trucks, water points and communal water tanks to internally displaced people. They also construct emergency latrines and distribute hygiene kits and tablets for water treatment. In urban areas, they provide fuel, spare parts and chlorine. They also help rehabilitate sewage systems. Together with GARWSP it installed 29 rural solar-powered water schemes in 2018. A total of 750 Rapid Response Teams intervened in 259 of Yemen's 333 districts whenever cholera cases were suspected by desludging and fixing damaged water and sewage pipes. These actions have significantly reduced the cholera cases in the affected districts.[75]

World Bank

[edit]

An Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Program Project supported by a US$150 million World Bank credit, approved in August 2002, aims at efficient and sustainable water and sanitation services in major urban areas. Their project has three components. The first rehabilitates and expands the water supply and sanitation infrastructure. The second component supports institutional restructuring and improving managerial capacities of local corporations; and to put in place an appropriate structure for a regulatory body for the urban water and sanitation sector in Yemen. A Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project—with US$20 million approved in December 2000 and additional financing of US$20 million approved in January 2008—aims to expand sustainable rural water supply and sanitation service coverage to mostly poor rural dwellers in ten governorates. Until 2007, 140 water sub-projects serving a population of 320,000 were completed.[69] In addition, three consecutive Social fund for Development Projects financed partly by the World Bank allocated an estimated 15% for rural water supply and sanitation.

Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD)

[edit]

The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD), a regional Arab funding institution, has financed several water and sanitation projects in Yemen. Examples are: the construction of the Sanaa' wastewater treatment plant (with a soft loan of around $30 million); the construction of wastewater networks in Sanaa' (first and second phase)(with two soft loans of around $100 million); the expansion of the Sanaa' wastewater treatment plant; the improvement of water and sanitation facilities in Aden (with a soft loan of around US$35 million); the construction of wastewater facilities in Seiyun and Tareem (with a soft loan of around US$50 million); and the Sanaa' Flood protection project (with a soft loan of around US$25 million). In November 2012, Arab Fund signed an agreement to finance the fourth phase of Sanaa' wastewater networks with a soft loan of about US$54 million. The construction will be completed before the end of 2017. In 2014, the Arab Fund signed an agreement to finance additional works in Sanaa' flood protection, with a soft loan of around US$35 million. In addition, AFESD provided several grants for the water and sanitation sector in Yemen. Examples are preparing wastewater study for old Sanaa' city, construction of a septage disposal facility in Sanaa'.

Germany

[edit]

Germany has played an important role in the implementation of urban water and sanitation reforms in Yemen since the mid-1990s, including through the support provided by GTZ to the technical secretariat in the Ministry in charge of the sector. GTZ supports the water and sanitation sector through a €23 million program for the Institutional Development of the Water Sector from 1994 to 2009. The program supports the decentralization reforms, strengthens local corporations, and establishes water basin committees and water resources management plans through training provided by NWSA and NWRA.[76]

In Mukalla on the Indian Ocean network losses in part of the city were reduced after rehabilitation measures financed by German development cooperation.

On behalf of the German government KfW development bank provides financing for water and sanitation investments in the city of Aden as well as in the towns of Al Shehr/Al Hami in Mukalla District, Mokha, Yarim, Amran, Sa'dah, Zabid, Bajil, Mansouria and Beit al-Faqih, the latter four being located in the Al Hudaydah Governorate.[51] An evaluation of an earlier project for the renewal and expansion of drinking water supply systems in eight provincial towns in Yemen (Bajil, Bait al Faqih, Al Mansouria, Zabid, Mokha, Amran, Yarim und Hajjah), and sanitation measures in three towns (Hajjah, Amran and Yarim) showed that the project largely achieved its objectives related to water supply. The quality of the construction work was rated as high and the collection of bills was considered to be "efficient". However, in Yarim the objective was not achieved due to water shortages. Only "modest improvements" were achieved regarding waste water disposal.[77] Another project to reduce water losses in Taiz and Mukalla was considered a partial failure: On the positive side, the evaluation showed that losses in the rehabilitated areas were reduced significantly. In Mukalla, where 40% of the network was rehabilitated, they were reduced from 22% to 8%. In Taiz, where only 12% of the network was rehabilitated, they fell from 45% to 6%. However, overall losses in the cities remained high at 30% in Mukalla and 47% in Taiz, because only parts of the network were rehabilitated. The cost of the measures was higher than expected due to the poorer than expected state of the network.[78] KfW is now in the process of applying robust, quantitative-based evaluation methods to more accurately assess the health impact of the interventions it supported in Yemeni towns based. This will be done through surveys including both beneficiaries and a control group.[79]

Netherlands

[edit]

The Netherlands have a long development assistance history in the Water Sector of Yemen (since 1978). Considerable amounts of funds have been used for urban and rural infrastructure projects in water and sanitation, irrigation, water resources assessment and management, but also for capacity development and organisational and institutional strengthening as well as Water Sector Reform.

Until the late nineties the assistance mainly consisted of projects, the slowly shifting to a program approach. Between 2006 and 2009, around €5 million per year is available for the water sector. Rural Water Supply and Water Resources Management will continue to be the main areas to which funds will be made available.

In February 2006, the Netherlands Minister for Development Cooperation at the time, during her visit to Yemen, signed a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) declaration between three partners:

  1. the Ta’iz Water Supply and Sanitation Local Corporation
  2. Vitens N.V. the largest drinking water supply company in the Netherlands
  3. the Netherlands Ministry for Development Cooperation.

The PPP will implement a three-year utility support program to improve the management and service delivery of the Ta’iz corporation. The PPP implementation costs a total amount of €1.5 million.[80]

Japan

[edit]

Japan International Cooperation Agency focuses its cooperation on rural water supply, building and rehabilitating water supply facilities in 20 remote villages in five governorates, including Sana'a, Ibb and Taiz.[81]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
  1. 1 2 3 4 5 WHO/UNICEF (2015) Progress on sanitation and drinking water - 2015 update and MDG assessment Archived 2014-04-18 at the Wayback Machine, Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation
  2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Ministry of Water and Environment:Performance Indicators Information System (PIIS), Final Annual Report 2007, by Abdulquader Hanesh, Saleh Al Koli, Faisal Al-Badani, Ranya Al-Sofi, Adel Morshed, Barbara Gerhager and Nadia Al Harithi, December 2008
  3. ↑ "Archived copy". Archived from the original on June 29, 2011. Retrieved February 27, 2011.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
  4. 1 2 "Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability". Archived from the original on 26 June 2015. Retrieved 21 April 2015.
  5. ↑ "UNDP Yemen: When Water is Hard to Reach and Climate Change Intensifies".
  6. 1 2 "Assessment of Water Resources in Sana'a Region, Yemen Republic (Case Study)".
  7. 1 2 "YEMEN: Time running out for solution to water crisis". IRIN. 13 August 2012. Retrieved 17 April 2015.
  8. ↑ Mahr, Krista (Dec 14, 2010). "What If Yemen Is the First Country to Run Out of Water?". Time. Retrieved 17 April 2015.
  9. 1 2 "Yemen Humanitarian Update - April 2026".
  10. 1 2 al-Mujahed, Ali; Naylor, Hugh (23 July 2015). "In Yemen's grinding war, if the bombs don't get you, the water shortages will". Washington Post. Retrieved 20 September 2015.
  11. ↑ riebert, Christiaan (5 February 2016). "Yemen's Bombed Water Infrastructure: An OSINT Investigation". Bellingcat. Retrieved 28 June 2017.
  12. ↑ Al-Hmani, Ahmed; Jamaa, Nejib ben; Kharroubi, Adel; Agoubi, Belgacem; Alwabr, Gawad MA (2024-04-14). "Case-control study of drinking water quality in Yemen". Eastern Mediterranean Health Journal. 30 (3): 212–220. doi:10.26719/emhj.24.019. ISSN 1020-3397.
  13. ↑ Cruickshank, Michael (13 March 2017). "Yemen is on the verge of running out of water". ThinkProgress. Retrieved 28 June 2017.
  14. ↑ Asrar, Shakeeb (28 June 2017). "Yemen: 'World's worst cholera outbreak' mapped". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 28 June 2017.
  15. 1 2 "WASHwatch.org - Yemen". washwatch.org. Retrieved 2017-03-22.
  16. ↑ "Yemen." CultureGrams Online Edition. ProQuest, 2011.
  17. ↑ Joint Monitoring Program for Water Supply and Sanitation:Estimates for the use of Improved Sanitation Facilities:Yemen, March 2010
  18. ↑ WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation - Data Tables Archived 2008-02-16 at the Wayback Machine, accessed on 7 March 2014
  19. 1 2 ""Water Has Changed Everything" | UNICEF Yemen". www.unicef.org. Retrieved 2026-06-23.
  20. ↑ Al-Hmani, Ahmed; Jamaa, Nejib ben; Kharroubi, Adel; Agoubi, Belgacem; Alwabr, Gawad MA (2024-04-14). "Case-control study of drinking water quality in Yemen". Eastern Mediterranean Health Journal. 30 (3): 212–220. doi:10.26719/emhj.24.019. ISSN 1020-3397.
  21. ↑ "UNDP Yemen: When Water is Hard to Reach and Climate Change Intensifies | United Nations in Yemen". yemen.un.org. Retrieved 2026-06-23.
  22. 1 2 3 Yemen Observer:Supply of urban water and sanitation to be decentralized, 4 December 2007
  23. 1 2 3 4 German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Yemeni-German Technical Cooperation Water Sector Programme:Customer Satisfaction Survey in Urban Water Supply and Sanitation in Seven Towns in Yemen - Bait Al-Faqih, Zabid, Mokha, Ibb, Amran, Abyan and Al-Shehr, April 2009
  24. ↑ "Being the Change in Yemen: Improving Integrated Water Resources Management for Food Security | United Nations in Yemen". yemen.un.org. Retrieved 2026-06-21.
  25. ↑ "Rebuilding the heart of Yemen's cities". UNOPS. Retrieved 2026-06-21.
  26. ↑ "UNOPS to further improve critical urban services across Yemen". UNOPS. Retrieved 2026-06-21.
  27. ↑ "Yemen Humanitarian Update - April 2026".
  28. ↑ "Case-control study of drinking water quality in Yemen".
  29. ↑ "Al-Nozaily F et al., 2019. Sanitary Engineering 2, Sana'a university, College of Engineering. Lectures book, Aljeel Al-Jadeed publishers, third edition, Sana'a, Yemen, quoted in: Fanack Water - Water Infrastructure in Yemen". Retrieved 10 January 2021.
  30. ↑ Unger Consult. "Sana'a Wastewater Treatment Plant Upgrade Capital of Sana'a, Republic of Yemen". Retrieved 22 December 2011.
  31. ↑ Salem Baquhaizel & Ahmed Salem Milkat (c. 2002). "Wastewater management and reuse in the Republic of Yemen" (PDF). Retrieved 22 December 2011.
  32. ↑ "Yemen: Sanitation services limited, sewage treatment plants poor". IRIN News. 5 March 2008. Retrieved 22 December 2011.
  33. 1 2 "The impact of attacks on urban services II: Reverberating effects of damage to water and wastewater systems on infectious disease".
  34. 1 2 Al-Mekhlafi, Hesham M. (2018-06-06). "Yemen in a Time of Cholera: Current Situation and Challenges". The American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene. 98 (6): 1558–1562. doi:10.4269/ajtmh.17-0811. ISSN 0002-9637. PMC 6086153. PMID 29557331.
  35. 1 2 "Yemen Integrated Urban Services Emergency Project (YIUSEP) — Third Additional Financing of the Yemen Emergency Human Capital Project (Report No: PPIAF000003)" (PDF).
  36. ↑ "From relief to resilience: Empowering rural Yemeni women through integrated economic support". UNDP. Retrieved 2026-07-04.
  37. ↑ National Water Resources Authority, Integrated Water Resources Management Program:Water Resources Information in Yemen, by Eng. Qahtan Al-Asbahi, ca. 2007
  38. 1 2 3 Lichtenthäler, Gerhard:Water Conflict and Cooperation in Yemen, Middle East Report 254, Spring 2010
  39. ↑ "A Holistic Approach to Addressing Water Resources Challenges in Yemen" (PDF). December 2022.
  40. ↑ Abdulla Noaman Water Environmental Center Sana’a University, Yemen (n.d.). "Adapting to water scarcity for Yemen's vulnerability communities: The case studies of Sana'a, Sadah and Aden" (PDF). The Netherlands Climate Assistance Program / ETC / Yemen Environmental Protection Agency / Stockholm Environment Institute. pp. Slide 13. Retrieved 9 March 2014.
  41. ↑ "Yemen's climate fragility trap: Trends, consequences, and pathways for policy action" (PDF).
  42. ↑ "Yemen's capital 'will run out of water by 2025'". SciDev.Net. Retrieved 2026-07-05.
  43. ↑ Kirby, Alex:"Yemen's khat habit soaks up water." BBC News, Sana’a, 7 April 2007
  44. ↑ Greenwood, J.E.G.W. and D. Bleackley. 1967. "Geology of the Arabian Peninsula- Aden Protectorate." USGS Professional Paper 560-C. Page C85.
  45. ↑ "Championing water resilience in Yemen through desalination efforts". UNDP. Retrieved 2026-07-06.
  46. ↑ "Water crisis in Taiz city: A carelessness or Siege?" (PDF).
  47. ↑ Al Sabahi, Esmail, Rahim, Abdul S., bin, Wan Yacob, Al Nozaily, Fadhl and Alshaebi, Fares. 2009. "A Study of Surface Water and Groundwater Pollution in Ibb City, Yemen." Electronic Journal of Geotechnical Engineering. Volume 14 F, Pages 1–12.
  48. ↑ Al Sabahi, E., Rahim, S. A., Wan Zuhairi, W. Y., Nozaily, F. A. and Alshaebi, F. 2009. "The Characteristics of Leachate and Groundwater Pollution at Municipal Solid Waste Landfill of Ibb City, Yemen." Am. J. Environ. Sci. Volume 5, Issue 3, Pages 256–266.
  49. ↑ "Yemen: Spotlight on water contamination - Yemen". ReliefWeb. Archived from the original on 2026-01-25. Retrieved 2026-07-06.
  50. 1 2 3 Al Falahi, Ali; Guangcan, Zhu (2025-02-14). "Challenges and solutions in water management: a comprehensive study of Yemen's water policies and practices". Water Policy. 27 (3): 317–333. doi:10.2166/wp.2025.218. ISSN 1366-7017.
  51. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Ministry of Water and Environment/GTZ:Yemen Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Reform, by Barbara Gerhager, Anwer Sahooly and Safwan Salam, January 2009
  52. ↑ "A Dangerous Addiction: Qat and Its Draining of Yemen's Water, Economy, and People". Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies. 2013-11-13. Retrieved 2026-07-08.
  53. ↑ [Joint Monitoring Program for Water Supply and Sanitation]:Data for Yemen Archived 2010-03-23 at the Wayback Machine
  54. 1 2 3 4 Sahooly, Anwer. "Summary Report Performance Monitoring of Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Utilities during crisis situation January-December 2011" (PDF). GIZ. Retrieved 8 March 2014.
  55. ↑ Al Falahi, Ali; Guangcan, Zhu (2025-02-14). "Challenges and solutions in water management: a comprehensive study of Yemen's water policies and practices". Water Policy. 27 (3): 317–333. doi:10.2166/wp.2025.218. ISSN 1366-7017.
  56. ↑ Christopher Ward; Sabine Beddies; Taha Taher; Anwer Sahooly; Barbara Gerhager; Nadia al Harithi (March 2009). "Equity and Efficiency in Yemen's Urban Water Reform – A Sector Study and Poverty and Social Impact Analysis" (PDF). Ministry of Water and Environment. pp. 48–49. Retrieved 9 March 2014.
  57. ↑ "اﻟﺒﻴﺌﺔ ﺣﻤﺎﻳﺔ" (PDF) (in Arabic). Retrieved 2023-11-08.
  58. ↑ "اﻟﻤﻴــــﺎﻩ ﻗﺎﻧﻮن" (PDF) (in Arabic). Retrieved 2023-11-08.
  59. ↑ Richards, Tony. 2002. “Assessment of Yemen Water Law: Final Report.” Prepared for: Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH. Page 1. URL: http://www.tc-wateryemen.org/documents/downloads/AssessmentofYemenWaterLawFinalReport.pdf
  60. ↑ "Comic answer to Yemen water crisis" - Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting, 4 September 2008
  61. ↑ "A Glimmer of Hope Supporting Abyan IDPs in the Governorate of Lahej". Yemeni-German Technical Cooperation - Water Sector Program. May 2012. Retrieved 8 March 2014.
  62. ↑ Mohammed bin Sallam (23 January 2012). "I DO NOT KNOW WHAT IS AHEAD FOR YEMENIS AFTER SALEH GOT IMMUNITY". Yemen Times. Retrieved 9 March 2014.
  63. ↑ "Time running out for solution to Yemen's water crisis". The Guardian. 26 August 2012. Retrieved 9 March 2014.
  64. ↑ Karasapan, Omer (2001-11-30). "The perfect humanitarian storm has arrived in Yemen". Brookings. Brookings Institution. Retrieved 20 September 2015.
  65. ↑ "Thousands in Yemen get sick in an entirely preventable cholera outbreak".
  66. ↑ "U.S. Support "Vital" to Saudi Bombing of Yemen, Targeting Food Supplies as Millions Face Famine". Democracy Now!.
  67. ↑ Kennedy, Jonathan (2017-08-02). "Blame the Saudis for Yemen's cholera outbreak – they are targeting the people | Jonathan Kennedy". The Guardian.
  68. ↑ "Access to water continues to be jeopardized for millions of children in war-torn Yemen".
  69. 1 2 3 World Bank:Project Information Document Appraisal Stage, Republic of Yemen, Rural Water Supply Additional Financing, December 5, 2007
  70. ↑ "Environment Protection Agency". Retrieved 22 December 2011.
  71. ↑ "nwra-yemen.org". Retrieved 21 April 2015.
  72. 1 2 3 "World Bank Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Project 2002". Retrieved 21 April 2015.
  73. ↑ Al-Mowafak, Hadil (November 2020). "The Time to Act on Yemen's Water Crisis is Now". Yemen Policy Center. Retrieved 10 January 2021.
  74. ↑ Naif, Mohammed; et al. (July 2018). "Water Supply in a War Zone: A Preliminary Analysis of Two Urban Water Tanker Supply Systems in the Republic of Yemen" (PDF). World Bank Water Global Practice Discussion Paper. Retrieved 10 January 2021.
  75. ↑ "UNICEF Yemen: Water, Sanitation and Hygiene". Retrieved 10 January 2021.
  76. ↑ GTZ:Yemen.Institutional Development of the Water Sector, 2005
  77. ↑ KfW:Yemen: Water supply and sanitation systems in provincial towns /work-intensive infrastructure measures under the water supply and sanitation project for provincial towns (Amran and Yarim):Ex post evaluation report, 2008
  78. ↑ KfW:Yemen: Water loss reduction programme:Ex post evaluation report, 2008
  79. ↑ KfW:Evaluation - The Water Sector in Yemen:'Robust' Methods, July 2010
  80. ↑ Dutch Embassy in Yemen:Water Sector
  81. ↑ "Water Resource Management - Yemen - Countries & Regions - JICA". Retrieved 21 April 2015.

Bibliography

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